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STATEMENT SHOWING APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
This appeal is properly within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. SHOULD THE APPEAL BE DISMISSED FOR APPELLANTS FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH RULE 24(a)(7) and 24(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE?
2. SHOULD THE APPEAL BE DISMISSED FOR APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE?
3. HAS APPELLANT ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE
SO LACKING IN SUPPORT AS TO BE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE, THUS MAKING THEM ERRONEOUS?
4. GIVEN THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, WAS IT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING RULINGS:
4.1. In December, 1985, Appellant entered into an oral Partnership agreement with
appellees Van Alstyne and Robinson, thus creating the Universal Video Partnership
(hereinafter the "Partnership") for the purpose of retail video business.
4.2. The terms of the Partnership Agreement required that, in exchange for
Robinson's loan of the $30,000.00 start-up funds for the business, Walsh and Van Alstyne
agreed: (a) to repay Robinson; (b) to be responsible for the partnership business debts;
and (c) to share in equal thirds with Robinson the business profits, even though it finally
turned out that there were no business profits.
4.3. As a manager of the Partnership's Universal Video business with responsibility
to manage the business so as to pay its debts, is responsible to repay Robinson for one-half
of Robinson's loans to the Partnership as set forth in the Facts above. The debt to
Robinson, after deducting all payments to him to date, totals $10,718.45 plus interest
through May 21,1989. Robinson should be granted judgment against Walsh effective May
21, 1989 against Walsh for one-half of that sum, $5,359.23.
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4.4. Pursuant to the terms of the Partnership agreement Walsh and Van Alstyne,
and not Robinson, were equally responsible for the business debts to Chytraus, Jet Star,
Oakwood, and other business creditors. Pursuant to his right of contribution per Section
48-1-15(1), Utah Code, as amended, Van Alstyne should be granted judgment against
Walsh effective May 21, 1989, for $24,346.82, which represents one-half of Van Alstyne's
$48,693.65 payments to creditors with his own money.
4.5. Walsh is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne and Robinson. For
Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne, Van Alstyne should be granted judgment
against Walsh for $24,346.82 actual damages. For Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to
Robinson, Robinson should be granted judgment against Walsh for $5,359.23 actual
damages.
4.6. The Sales Agreement entered into by Walsh and Erickson May 2,1985 is void
for lack of consideration and void for failure of consideration. Even if the Sales
Agreement were not void for lack of consideration, it is void for failure of consideration.
4.7. Appellant's "Motion for Summary Enforcement of Settlement Agreement"
should be denied and Defendants should be granted judgment against Plaintiff for $3200.00
attorney's fees incurred in defending against the motion.
5. ARE THE ISSUES WHICH APPELLANT RAISES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The determinative statutes are §§48-1-1 through 48-1-40, copied and attached hereto in the
addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case: This case arose from a number of disputes between the parties
concerning their real or silleged partnership interests.
Course of the proceedings and disposition at trial court: Walsh filed an action against
Appellees in the Third District Court, alleging breach of a purported sales agreement pursuant
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to which he allegedly sold all of his partnership interest to Erickson. Appellees counterclaimed
alleging causes of action including breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, and
unjust enrichment. After a two-day trial, the trial court ruled for Appellees on all of their claims.
Appellant filed and lost a motion objecting to appellee's proposed forms of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law and Judgment. Appellant filed and lost a Motion for New Trial. Having lost
at his attempts to prevent entry of the judgments against him from the first trial, appellant next
filed a Motion for Summary Enforcement of Settlement Agreement, alleging that the parties had
entered into a settlement agreement to liquidate the judgments from the trial. There was no such
settlement agreement. Appellant's own arguments at trial supported appellees' firm position that
there was no settlement agreement by any stretch of the imagination.

RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
In December, 1984, appellant entered into an oral Partnership agreement with appellees
Van Alstyne and Robinson, creating the Universal Video Partnership (hereinafter the
"Partnership") for the purpose of retail video business. [T. pp. 4, 47.] Walsh had previous
experience and success in that line of business.

Van Alstyne and Robinson had no such

experience. Van Alstyne and Robinson entered into the Partnership and thereby assumed
substantial obligations: (1) in reliance on Walsh's experience and success in the video retail
business [T. pp. 8, 48-49, 54-55]; (2) in reliance on Walsh's self-professed net worth of
approximately $243,500.00 [T. pp.59-63, 125-127; and Defendants' Exhibit 10 for Trial #1.]; (3)
in reliance on Walsh's promises that the Partnership Business would be profitable with certainly
ERV40606.BRF
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enough revenue to pay Jet Star Contract, the Oakwood lease, the Chytraus contract, and the
$30,000.00 plus interest to Robinson; (4) in reliance on Walsh's assurances that Walsh would
mortgage his home if necessary to repay Robinson [T. pp. 56-63, 65]; and (5) in reliance on the
fact that Walsh was an L.D.S. Bishop and returned missionary and lifelong friend of Van Alstyne.
[T. pp. 5, 223, 296-297.]
The Partnership agreement included the following terms:
1. Robinson's obligations: Loan $30,000.00 to Walsh and Van Alstyne [T. pp. 5759, 186-187, 192.] for their $25,000.00 payment on the Jet Star Contract and $5,000.00 for
operating expenses. Robinson was a "silent partner" with no obligation to manage the
business or pay its debts. [T. pp.297-299.]
2. Walsh's and Van Alstyne's obligations:
2.1. Assume joint liability to repay Robinson the full $30,000.00 plus interest
at 19.41% per annum (3% plus the 16.41% rate Robinson was paying to his bank for the
second mortgage on his home to get the $30,000.00) [T. pp. 56-59, 91-94,292-293,308-309,
and p. 310 re Plaintiffs Exhibit 32 from Trial #1; Defendant's Exhibits 18, 27, and 31 from
Trial #1.]
2.2. Contribute time and labor to manage and run the business [T. pp. 5,
134-135.] to pay expenses and make a profit.
2.3. Assume joint and several liability for the following Partnership Business
obligations including the following contracts [T. pp. 4, 78-80.]: (a) Jet Star contract to
purchase the business known as Universal Video (the "Partnership Business"). [T. p. 194,
198, 226; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 from Trial #1.]; (b) the "Oakwood Lease" of the premises
for Partnership Business operations, which obligated Walsh and Van Alstyne to eighteen
monthly payments of $1,420.00 to $1,440.00. [T. p. 227; Defendant's Exhibit 17 from Trial
#1.]; and (c) personally guarantee and assume joint and several liability to Oscar E.
Chytraus Company ("Chytraus") the primary vendor of video tapes for the Partnership
Business, by signing an Application for Credit and personal guarantee to Oscar E. Chytraus
Company (hereinafter "Chytraus") [T. p. 82; Defendants' Exhibit 15 from Trial #1.].
Neither Walsh nor Van Alstyne intended nor asked Robinson to be responsible for Jet Star
contract, the Oakwood lease, or any other Universal Video business debts. [T. pp. 69, 79,
82-83, 226-227.]
ERV40606.BRF
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3. Rights to profits of the Universal Video Business: Walsh, Van Alstyne, and
Robinson were to share net profits equally after debts to Robinson and third parties had
been paid. [T. pp. 4, 224, 297-299.]
Unbeknownst to Van Alstyne or Robinson, before Walsh signed the Jet Star contract in
December, 1984, and before Robinson provided the $30,000.00 loan, Walsh had been concerned
that the Partnership Business income would be insufficient to make the Jet Star and Robinson
payments. [T. pp. 65-66., 193-194.] Walsh did not disclose those financial worries to Van Alstyne
until after Robinson had already loaned the $30,000.00, and after Walsh and Van Alstyne had
cosigned on the Jet Star Contract, the Oakwood Lease, and the personal guarantee to Chytraus.
[T. pp. 65-66, 81.] From the beginning of business operations until May, 1985 when Walsh
abandoned the Partnership, the Business revenue was so low that Walsh became concerned "that
the store wasn't going to make it in the spring or the summer without an infusion of some
additional revenues!;;]" [quotation from T. p. 199; also see T. pp. 65-71,104,198-199.] In March,
1985, Walsh shocked Van Alstyne by disclosing that he was facing personal bankruptcy and that,
therefore, he had no assets to pay his obligations on the Partnership Business should the business
revenue be insufficient. [T. pp. 71, 109.] Consequently, Walsh and Van Alstyne tried, without
success, to sell the Partnership Business. [T. pp. 69-71,199-200.] With the newfound information
of Walsh's personal financial distress, Van Alstyne began to look for alternate sources to help pay
$35,000.00 on the Jet Star contract in June, 1985, and to contribute additional monies for the
business. [T. pp. 74-75.] From May, 1985, until spring of 1986, Van Alstyne, Robinson, and
Erickson considered various possibilities and made several proposals back and forth for Erickson
to become an additional "partner" in the business. No agreement was ever reached. [T. pp. 25,
ERV40606.BRF
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26, 29-30, 44, 74-77, 108-112, 147-149, 176-177; Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 from Trial #1.]
Negotiations with Erickson notwithstanding, neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson ever
released or offered to release Walsh from his Partnership obligations for the Jet Star contract, the
Oakwood lease, the Chytraus debts, the Robinson loan, or any other of his partnership obligations.
[T. pp. 4 (stipulation), 75, 98-99, 119-120, 135, 150, 155, 384.] In April-May, 1985, without
informing Van Alstyne or Robinson, Walsh negotiated with Erickson to sell her his Partnership
interest for $10,000.00, a sales price determined by Walsh and characterized by him as "a fairly
arbitrary figure." [T. p. 240.] Walsh kept his sales agreement with Erickson secret from Van
Alstyne and Robinson, although Erickson thought they were awaire of it because Walsh told
Erickson before she signed any of the sales documents that Van Alstyne had approved. Erickson
was naive and inexperienced in business matters. [T. pp. 285-291.] She trusted and believed in
Walsh and thus let him induce her into believing that she was purchasing all of his Partnership
interest for $10,000. Erickson relied on Walsh's experience in the video business and her belief
that he was looking out for her best interests because he represented himself as "a good church
man" whom she could trust him to help her. [T. pp. 149-150, 167.]
On May 2,1985, Erickson and Walsh executed these four documents which were prepared
by an attorney of Walsh's at Walsh's request [T. pp. 203, 219] for his purported sale of his
Partnership interest to Erickson for $10,000.00: (1) Sales Agreement [Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 of Trial
#1]; (2) Promissory Note [Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 of Trial #1]; (3) Assignment and Assumption
Agreement [Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 of Trial #1]; and (4) Consent to Assignment [Plaintiffs Exhibit
5 of Trial #1]. The Consent to Assignment, which was necessary for completion of Walsh's sale
ERV40606.BRF
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to Erickson;was not signed by nor agreed to by three necessary parties: Oakwood Village
Partnership (for the partnership lease), Jet Star Industries, Inc., and Van Alstyne. [T. pp. 147-149,
220, 256.]
Neither Walsh nor Erickson informed Van Alstyne or Robinson about the terms of their
May 2, 1985, transaction or those four documents. The first time Van Alstyne or Robinson saw
any of those documents was in autumn of 1986 when they saw a copy of the Promissory Note
attached the Complaint in this action. [T. pp. 38, 96-99, 293.] Nevertheless, before Erickson
signed the four documents, Walsh told Erickson that Van Alstyne had approved the documents.
The purported Sales Agreement between Walsh and Erickson was an ambiguous combination of
the above-referenced four documents and a number of other oral representations made on various
occasions. [T. pp. 246-249, 285-290.] Though the Walsh-Erickson sales agreement in totality was
ambiguous, the Sales Agreement document included these two provisions: (1) Walsh purportedly
sold his Partnership rights and Partnership interest to Erickson; and (2) Erickson purportedly
assumed Walsh's Partnership obligations including the following: Jet Star obligation; Chytraus
obligation; Oakwood Lease; and utilities. [Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 from Trial #1.]
Walsh told Erickson not to worry about the Partnership debts because all Partnership bills
"were being paid by the store" and that the "store revenues " would continue to pay the debts. [T.
pp. 160-162, 230, 240-242.] Further, Walsh told Erickson it was not necessary to pay Robinson
because there was no contract with Robinson [T. p. 163.] and that, therefore, Robinson "didn't
have a claim to the store . . . [and that] Robinson couldn't prove that he had given the $30,000."
[T. p. 288.] From June through October, 1985, Erickson paid Walsh $5,500.00 toward the
ERV40606.BRF
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$10,000.00 to purchase Walsh's partnership interest: $3,000 paid to Walsh May 2,1985 and $500
per month for the next five months. [T. p. 5.] After paying the October, 1985 $500.00 installment
to Walsh, Erickson ceased paying Walsh.
When Walsh negotiated his purported sale to Erickson, he did not disclose to Erickson that
Van Alstyne had made demand on Walsh to help pay $30,000.00 due Jet Star May 31, 1985.
Before Van Alstyne made that Jet Star payment Van Alstyne made demand on Walsh to help
satisfy the Partnership obligations. Walsh refused, telling Van Alstyne he was facing bankruptcy
and that he hadn't the assets to spend on those obligations. [T. p. 109.] Over several months
following, Van Alstyne made additional demands on Walsh to contribute to pay Partnership
Business debts, and each time Walsh refused. [T. pp. 120, 130, 280, 283-284.]

Van Alstyne

mortgaged his family residence for $30,000.00 in June, 1985, to pay on the Jet Star contract. [T.
pp. 5, 113.]

Having been abandoned by their partner Walsh, Van Alstyne and Robinson

proceeded to wind up the Partnership Business.
After several unsuccessful attempts to sell the Universal Video business [T42 and 43], Van
Alstyne and Robinson sold the inventory in June 1986 to Video USA for $25,835.00. All of those
sales proceeds were applied to pay Partnership Business debts. |[T. p. 5.] Van Alstyne was
damaged by paying these amounts, either as cash out of pocket or as lost interest, to satisfy
the business debts:
$30,000.00

plus interest at 10% per annum June 3,1985 for discounted payment on Jet
Star [Defendant's Exhibit 25 from Trial #1.]

$ 5,200.00

plus interest at 13% per annum December 18,1985 for one-half of $6,038.00
final payment to Chytraus and one-half of $4,362.00 final payment on jet

ERV40606.BRF
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Star contract.
+ 13,493.65
$48,693.65

Total interest at the above specified 10% and 13% rates
TOTAL VAN ALSTYNE PAYMENTS TO SATISFY PARTNERSHIP
BUSINESS DEBTS OWED JOINTLY BY HIM AND WALSH.

[T. pp. 271-274, 280, 305-309, and pp. 310-312 re Plaintiffs Exhibit 32 from Trial #1; Defendants'
Exhibit 30 from Trial #1.]
Robinson paid these sums to satisfy the Partnership Business debts: In addition to the
initial $30,000.00 loan at 19.41% per annum, Robinson loaned the business $5,200.00 at 13% per
annum December 18, 1985 for one-half of the $6,038.00 final payment to Chytraus and one-half
of the $4,632.00 final payment on the Jet Star Contract. The amount that Walsh and Van Alstyne
jointly owed Robinson through May 21, 1989 was $10,717.45. [T. pp. 91, 294-295, 300-305, and
pp. 310-312 re Plaintiffs Exhibit 32 from Trial #1; Defendant's Exhibits 18 and 31 from Trial #1.]
No settlement or liquidation agreement was ever reached between the parties after the trial
court entered the judgments for appellees.

Appellant brought a "Motion for Summary

Enforcement of Settlement Agreement" alleging such a settlement. That motion was nonmeritorious and had no merit. See transcript of the trial on that motion.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The appeal should be dismissed because appellant made no attempt to marshal the
evidence. There is no statement of relevant facts in appellants brief. The trial court's rulings
should be upheld and appellees should be awarded their costs and attorney's fees for defending
this non-meritorious appeal.
ERV40606.BRF
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1. THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR APPELLANTS FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH RULE 24(a)(7) and 24(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE.
Rule 24(a)(7) states:
. . . A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow.
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported
by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
Rule 24(e) states:
References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant
to Rule 11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of
the evidence of proceedings . . .. References to exhibits shall include exhibit
numbers.
There is no statement of facts in the "Statement of the Case" or anywhere else in appellant's brief.
Further, appellant bases his arguments on many facts which were not in evidence at trial, and he
fails to cite the source of those purported facts. In Steele v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n,
204 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 at 34, 845 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this court ruled that
An appellant's brief must contain a "statement of the facts relevant to the issues
presented for review," and "[a]ll statements of fact and references to the proceedings
below shall be supported by citations to the record." Likewise, subsection (a)(9a)
of Rule 24 requires the argument in a brief to contain "citations to the . . . parts of
the record relied on" therein. Briefs that do not comply with Rule 24 "may be
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney
fees against the offending lawyer." Utah R. App. Procedure 24(k).
If a party fails to provide a statement of the facts along with a citation to the
record where those facts are supported, we will assume the correctness of the
judgment. [Citations.]
If a party fails to make a concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in the record
where those facts are supported, the court will assume the correctness of the judgment below.
2. THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO
ERV40606.BRF
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MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
This court's ruling in Oneida v. Oneida, 236 U.A.R. 24, 25 (Utah App. 1994) places a heavy
burden on the appellant who challenges the trial court's findings of fact:
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when challenging
factual finding. To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate
counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves]
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to
properly discharge the [marshaling] duty . . . , the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced
at trial which supports the very findings the appellants resist .' [Citations.] Once
appellants have established every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they
then must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence and show why those pillars fail to
support the trial court's findings. [Citations.] They must show the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence,"
thus making them "clearly erroneous." [Citations.]
Accordingly, "[w]hen the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, we
refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings
as valid." [Citations.]
Not only did appellant make no effort to marshal evidence in his brief, he did not even
acknowledge the concept of marshaling evidence in his brief. Because appellant has failed to
marshal the evidence. The court should uphold all of the trial court's findings of fact.
3. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH, INDEED HE DID NOT EVEN
SHOW AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH, THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE SO
LACKING IN SUPPORT AS TO BE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE,
THUS MAKING THEM ERRONEOUS.
Because appellant has failed to meet his burden in challenging the trial court's findings, the
findings of fact must be upheld.
4. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT APPLIED
UTAH PARTNERSHIP LAW TO ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND MADE THESE RULINGS
ERV40606.BRF
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AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS [R. at 000543-000566, in addendum attached hereto]:
4.1. In December, 1985, Appellant entered into an oral Partnership agreement with
appellees Van Alstyne and Robinson, thus creating the Universal Video Partnership
(hereinafter the "Partnership") for the purpose of retail video business.
4.2. The terms of the Partnership Agreement required that, in exchange for
Robinson's loan of the $30,000.00 start-up funds for the business, Walsh and Van Alstyne
agreed: (a) to repay Robinson; (b) to be responsible for the partnership business debts;
and (c) to share in equal thirds with Robinson the business profits, even though it finally
turned out that there were no business profits.
4.3. As a manager of the Partnership's Universal Video business with responsibility
to manage the business so as to pay its debts, is responsible to repay Robinson for one-half
of Robinson's loans to the Partnership as set forth in the Facts above. The debt to
Robinson, after deducting all payments to him to date, totals $10,718.45 plus interest
through May 21, 1989. Robinson is entitled to judgment against Walsh effective May 21,
1989 against Walsh for one-half of that sum, $5,359.23.
4.4. Pursuant to the terms of the Partnership agreement Walsh and Van Alstyne,
and not Robinson, were equally responsible for the business debts to Chytraus, Jet Star,
Oakwood, and other business creditors. Pursuant to his right of contribution per Section
48-1-15(1), Utah Code, as amended, Van Alstyne is entitled to judgment against Walsh
effective May 21, 1989, for $24,346.82, which represents one-half of Van Alstyne's
$48,693.65 payments to creditors with his own money.
4.5. Walsh is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne and Robinson. For
Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne, Van Alstyne should be granted judgment
against Walsh for $24,346.82 actual damages. For Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to
Robinson, Robinson should be granted judgment against Walsh for $5,359.23 actual
damages.
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Walsh breached his
fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne and Robinson in many ways,, First, before borrowing the
$30,000.00 from Robinson to purchase the Universal Video business under the Jet Star
Contract, Walsh was wary of the debt service on the contract and was concerned that the
business revenue would not cover the debt serve, let alone the loan payments to Robinson
ERV40606.BRF
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and the other business debts, and yet he borrowed the $30,000.00 from Robinson and had
Van Alstyne cosign with Walsh on the underlying contracts and personal guarantee to
Chytraus without warning Van Alstyne and Robinson of the risk involved.
Second, Walsh breached his fiduciary duties when he abandoned the
Partnership May 2, 1985, leaving Van Alstyne to manage and pay the debts of a business
in which he had virtually no experience, and leaving the debt to Robinson unpaid.
Further, Walsh breached his fiduciary duties when he attempted to sell his
partnership interest to Erickson without fully disclosing to Van Alstyne and Robinson the
terms of the sale and without informing them that he received $5,500.00 from Erickson.
The trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the said breaches of
fiduciary duty were done by Walsh in a manner that showed a knowing and reckless
indifference to and disregard of the rights of Van Alstyne and Robinson, and that Walsh
either knew or should have known that he said conduct would, in a high degree of
probability, result in substantial harm to Van Alstyne and Robinson. Appellant has failed
to rebut those judicial findings.
4.6. The Sales Agreement entered into by Walsh and Erickson May 2,1985 is void
for lack of consideration and void for failure of consideration.
Even if the Sales Agreement were not void for lack of consideration, it is void for failure
of consideration. Section I of the Agreement purported to convey to Erickson all of
Walsh's one-third partnership rights and interest in the Universal Video business. Walsh
did not have the authority or right to convey his Partnership rights. Walsh's sale to
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Erickson was tantamount to the proverbial "sale of the Brooklyn Bridge". Walsh's promise
to convey all of his partnership rights to Erickson was illusory because it required approval
(never obtained) by Van Alstyne and Robinson.
When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement. . . such .
. . that the person making it commits himself to nothing, the alleged
"promise" is said to be "illusory". An illusory promise, neither binds the
person making it, [Citation], nor functions as consideration for a return
promise.
Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company Inc., 706 P.2d
1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). Thus the Sales Agreement is void for lack of consideration
because Walsh's promise to convey his Partnership rights to Erickson was illusory because
it committed Walsh to nothing because he had no legal right to make that commitment
without consent from Van Alstyne and Robinson.
4.7. Even if the Sales Agreement were not void for lack of consideration, it would
be void for failure of consideration.
When consideration is lacking, there is no contract. When consideration fails, there was
a contract when the agreement was made, but the promised performance has failed.
DeMentas v. Estate of Tallas, 95 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah App. 1988). Walsh failed to
deliver the consideration (his Partnership rights) to Erickson because he was never
authorized to do so by the other partners, Van Alstyne and Robinson.
4.8. All partners' consents are required for sale of partner's rights: Pursuant to
Sections 48-1-21 and 48-1-24, Utah Code, as amended, both Van Alstyne's and Robinson's
consent would be required to imbue Erickson with Walsh's Partnership rights (as opposed
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to his mere Partnership interest, which is the partner's right to profits) to manage or
administer Partnership business or affairs.
4.8.1. Neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson consented, either explicitly or
implicitly, to the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement.
Van Alstyne and Robinson did not even see the document until this lawsuit was
filed. After Erickson signed the documents and began paying Walsh the $500.00
monthly installment, several months of arguments ensued between Erickson and
Van Alstyne because Van Alstyne and Robinson did not ever accept Erickson as a
full one-third partner to replace Walsh.
4.8.2. Neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson released Walsh from his
Partnership obligations.
The fact that Van Alstyne and Robinson made significant Partnership business
decisions after May 1, 1985 without consulting Walsh does not imply a release of
Walsh or a consent to his sale to Erickson. Walsh abandoned the partnership May
2, 1985. Section 48-1-6, Utah Code, as amended, provides that a partner who
abandons the Partnership business does not have to be included in other partners1
decisions to sell or assign Partnership property. There was no novation to substitute
Erickson for Walsh to pay Walsh's Partnership obligations. "For a novation to
occur, there must be (1) an existing and valid contract, (2) an agreement to the new
contract by all parties, (3) a new valid contract, and (4) an extinguishment of the
old contract by the new one." Hormana v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346,1352-1353 (Utah
App. 1987).
ERV40606.BRF
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4.9. Neither mistake of fact nor mistake of law by Erickson or Walsh would
validate the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement.
Even if Walsh and Erickson both mistakenly believed when they entered in to the
Sales Agreement that Van Alstyne and Robinson had consented to the Agreement, that
mistake would not be grounds for validating the Sales Agreement. Moonev v. GR and
Associates. 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah App. 1987). To allow such a mistake of fact to validate
the Sales Agreement would be analogous to validating a contract for sale of the Brooklyn
Bridge by a seller who believed he had legal rights to sell the bridge but who in fact did
not. Rather than being validated because it was obtained by mistake, the Sales Agreement
is voidable because obtained by mistake.
As to mistake of law, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Walsh's or Erickson's
mistake in legal interpretation of the Sales Agreement (mistakenly believing the Agreement
was legally valid because of mistaken belief that partner's consent is not legal requirement
for other partner's sale of his Partnership rights) would not be grounds sufficient for
validating the Agreement. Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9 (Utah 1982).
4.10The Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement is not severable so as to make Erickson
liable to Walsh for the $10,000,00 contract price and award her only Walsh's Partnership
interest (right to accounts receivable) instead of all of his Partnership rights.
Partners' management rights are not assignable without the other partners1 consent. There
is no severability clause in the Sales Agreement. Section I of the Sales Agreement
purports to sell all of Walsh's Partnership rights and interest in one total package. The
Sales Agreement does not break down the $10,000.00 sales price into units separately
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specifying a certain sum for Walsh's Partnership rights and another sum for Walsh's
Partnership interest. Further, there was no indication by Walsh or Erickson at trial of any
intent by either of them that the contract be severable. "A contract is severable or entire
depending on the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract."
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2e 406, 408 (Utah 1980).
4.11. Appellant's "Motion for Summary Enforcement of Settlement Agreement"
should be denied and Defendants should be allowed to collect their judgments against
Plaintiff for $3200.00 attorneys fees incurred in defending against the motion.
As with the other issues, appellant made no attempt to marshal the evidence to
attack the trial court's findings. There is no credible evidence of any settlement agreement.
Indeed, appellant's own arguments at trial supported appellees' firm position that their
judgments entered against appellant in the first trial had not been satisfied, settled, or
otherwise liquidated.
5. THE ISSUES WHICH APPELLANT RAISES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
Appellant's arguments number THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT, NINE, and
TEN should be stricken because they are all based on erroneous and unsubstantiated facts and
conclusions contrary to the findings of fact in the court below.
Appellant's arguments number TWELVE and THIRTEEN should be stricken because they
raise issues not raised at the trial court level. John Deere v. A&H Equipment 241 U.A.R. 17.
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CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The appeal should be dismissed forthwith so that appellees may proceed to collect their
long overdue moneys for judgments awarded them by the trial court:
Judgments entered almost \

years ago, October 30,1990, for Defendants against Plaintiff, (not

including interest since May 31, 1990 or post-judgment costs) total $51,563.54 as follows:
Judgment for Erickson;
$5,500.00
+2,755.75
$8,255.75
10/31/90
+ 1,566.38
$9,822.13

Principal judgment for Erickson
10% pre-judgment interest from 10/31/85
through 10/31/90 ($1.51 per diem)
TOTAL JUDGMENT with pre-judgment interest through
12% post-judgment interest from 10/31/90
through 5/31/92 ($2.71 per diem)
TOTAL JUDGMENT PLUS INTEREST FOR ERICKSON
THROUGH MAY 31,1992 (does not include post-judgment
costs, and does not include interest accruing
on judgment at 12% per annum after May 31, 1992)

Judgment for Robinson;
$5,359.23
+ 1,849.26

Principal judgment for Robinson
10% pre-judgment interest from 5/21/87 through
10/31/90 ($1.47 per diem)
$7,208.49
TOTAL JUDGMENT with pre-judgment interest
through 10/31/90
+ 1,396.86
12% post-judgment interest from 10/31/90
through 5/31/92 ($2.37 per diem)
$8,578.35
TOTAL JUDGMENT PLUS INTEREST FOR ROBINSON
THROUGH MAY 31,1992 (does not include post-judgment
costs, and does not include interest accruing
on judgment at 12% per annum after May 31, 1992)
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Judgment for Van Alstyne;
$24,346.82
+ 3,521.76

Principal judgment for Van Alstyne
10% pre-judgment interest from 5/21/89 to
10/31/90 TS6.67 per diem)
$27,868.58 TOTAL JUDGMENT with pre-judgment interest
through 10/31/90
+ $ 5,294.48 12% post-judgment interest from 10/31/90
through 5/31/92 ($9.16 per diem)
$33,163.06 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLUS INTEREST FOR VAN ALSTYNE
THROUGH MAY 31,1992 (does not include postjudgment costs, and does not include interest
accruing on judgment at 12% per annum after May
31, 1992.)
The appeal is without merit and was filed solely to delay and avoid payment of the
appellees' judgments. Pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Appellees should be awarded judgment against appellant for their costs and attorney's fees in
defense, of the appeal.

DATED this

day of July, 1994.

rney for Appellees
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PARTNERSHIP
Chapter
1. General Partnership.
2. Limited Partnership [Repealed].
2a. Utah Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
2b. Utah Limited Liability Company Act.
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Interpretation of knowledge and
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"Partnership" defined.
Joint venture defined — Application of chapter.
Rules for determining the existence of a partnership.
Partnership property.
Partner agent of partnership as to
partnership business.
Conveyance of real property of
partnership.
Partnership bound by admission
of partner.
Partnership charged with knowledge of or notice to partner.
Partnership bound by partner's
wrongful act.
Partnership bound by partner's
breach of trust.
Nature of partner's liability.
Partner by estoppel.
Liability of incoming partner.
Rules determining rights and duties of partners.
Partnership books.
Duty of partners to render information.
Partner accountable as a fiduciary.
Right to an account.
Continuation of partnership beyond fixed term.
Extent of property rights of a

48-1-23.
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48-1-39.
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Nature of a partner's right in specific partnership property.
Nature of partner's interest in the
partnership.
Assignment of partner's interest.
Partner's interest subject to
charging order.
"Dissolution" defined.
Partnership not terminated by
dissolution.
Causes of dissolution.
Dissolution by decree of court.
General effect of dissolution on
authority of partner.
Right of partner to contribution
from copartners after dissolution.
Power of partner to bind partnership to third persons after dissolution.
Effect of dissolution on partner's
existing liability.
Right to wind up.
Rights of partners to application
of partnership property.
Rights where partnership is dissolved for fraud or misrepresentation.
Rules for distribution.
Liability of persons continuing
the business in certain cases.
Rights of retiring or estate of deceased partner when t h e business is continued.
Accrual of actions.

Definition of terms.

In this chapter;
"Court" includes every court and judge having jurisdiction in the case.
"Business" includes every trade, occupation or profession.
"Person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and other associations.
"Bankrupt" includes bankrupt under the federal bankruptcy laws or
insolvent under any state insolvency law.
"Conveyance" includes every assignment, lease, mortgage or encumbrance.
"Real property" includes land and any interest or estate in land.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, J 2; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 69-1-1.
Uniform Laws. — Jurisdictions that have
enacted the Uniform Partnership Act are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-

tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Cross-References. — Banks by partnership
forbidden, § 7-3-2.
Insolvency defined, § 25-6-3.

\

NOTES TO DECISIONS
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Cited in Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil
Prods., 114 F.R.D. 69 (D. Utah 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 1 to 4.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 1, 2.
A.L.R. — Joint venturers' comparative liability for losses, in absence of express agreement, 51 A.L.R.4th 371.

!

Determination of citizenship of partnership,
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28
USCS § 1332(a), 83 A.L.R. Fed. 136.

<<

48-1-2.

Interpretation of knowledge and notice.

(1) Within the meaning of this chapter, a person is deemed to have knowledge of a fact not only when he has actual knowledge thereof, but also when
he has knowledge of such other facts that to act in disregard of them shows
bad faith.
(2) A person has notice of a fact within the meaning of this chapter when
the person who claims the benefit of the notice:
(a) states the fact to such person; or,
(b) delivers through the mail, or by other means of communication, a
written statement of the fact to such person, or to a proper person at his
place of business or residence.
History: L. 1921, ch. 69, § 3; U.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 69-1-2.
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48-1-4

8-1-3. "Partnership" defined.

48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined — Application of chapter.

A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as cowners a business for profit.
But any association formed under any other statute of this state, or any
tatute adopted by authority other than the authority of this state, is not a
partnership under this chapter, unless such association would have been a
artnership in this state prior to the adoption of this chapter; but this chapter
hall apply to limited partnerships except in so far as the statutes relating to
uch partnerships are inconsistent herewith.

(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners of a single business enterprise.
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of joint ventures.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence of partnership,
foint stock company.
Vlining partnership.
Requisites of partnership.
Evidence of p a r t n e r s h i p .
Evidence relating to joint operation of a cafe
established that relationship of parties was
hat of partnership as defined in this section.
Eardley v. Sammons, 8 Utah 2d 159, 330 P.2d
122 (1958).
Joint stock company.
A joint stock company is generally classified
as a partnership possessing some of the characteristics of a corporation. Rocky Mt. Stud Farm
Co. v. Lunt, 46 U t a h 299, 151 P. 521 (1915).
Mining partnership.
For cases discussing common-law mining
partnership, see Bentley v. Brossard, 33 Utah
396, 94 P. 736 (1908); Mud Control Lahs. v.
Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854 (1954).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

H i s t o r y : L. 1921, ch. 89, § 6; R.S. 1933 & C.
943, 69-1-3.

ANALYSIS

History: C. 1953, 48-1-3.1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 14, § 1.

Requisites of partnership.
The requisites of partnership are that parties must have joined together to carry on
trade or adventure for their common benefit,
each contributing property or services, and
having community of interest in profits. Bentley v. Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908).
An organization of workers, formed for the
purpose of performing and undertaking contracts for bricklaying jobs, did not have the essential elements of either a general or limited
partnership, where all the equipment used by
workers belonged to one individual who had
sole authority to make contracts for himself
and the organization, and where workers were
not entitled to share in profits equally or on
any fixed percentage basis, were not chargeable for losses, nor permitted to determine the
means or methods of operating. Johanson Bros.
Bldrs. v. Board of Review, 118 Utah 384, 222
P.2d 563 (1950).

for the venture's entire loss. Producer's Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. Christensen, 588 P.2d 156
(Utah 1978).

Agreement to share profits required.
Continuation of venture presumed.
Joint venture not found.
Litigation.
Shared facilities.

Joint venture not found.
There was no joint adventure or partnership
by estoppel where one of the two alleged joint
adventurers had not given his consent to being
held out as a joint adventurer with the person
the
m a k i n g the representation, and where
t h i r ( j person to whom the representation had
b e e n m a d e h a d n o t reiied u p o n it
Bates v
Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952).

Agreement to share profits required.
To establish a joint adventure there must be
an agreement, express or implied, for the sharing of profits. Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165,
239 P.2d 749 (1952).
Fact t h a t the person who finances the sale of
a used car thereby realizes profit does not
make him a joint adventurer with the seller.
Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749
(1952).

Litigation.
Joint venturers may sue in the name of the
joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 767
P 2 d 499 (Utah 1988).

Continuation of venture presumed.
Fact that one joint venturer reimbursed the
other for the latter's contribution did not, in
itself, indicate termination of the joint venture,
thereby making first joint venturer responsible

Shared facilities.
Used car dealers who share a lot, building,
and telephone do not become joint adventurers
by reason of that working arrangement. Bates
v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ventures §§ 1 to 71.
C . J . S . — 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures §§ 1 to
73.
A.L.R. — Construction of agreement be-

tween real-estate agents to share commissions,
71 A.L.R.3d 586.
Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R. 1th
1234.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Propriety, under state statutes or bar association or court rules, of formation of multistate
law partnership or professional service corporation, 6 A.L.R.4th 1251.
Key Numbers. — Partnership «= 1 to 26.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 1 to 11.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 1 to 21.
A.L.R. — Construction of agreement between real-estate agents to share commissions,
71 A.L.R.3d 586.
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48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partnership.
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Section 48-1-13, persons who are not partners
as to each other are not partners as to third persons.
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by entireties, joint
property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish
a partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits
made by the use of the property.
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common
right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived.
11

PARTNERSHIP

48-1-4

(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is
prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such
inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord.
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner.
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary
with the profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or
other property by installments or otherwise.
History: L. 1921, c h . 89, § 7; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 69-1-4.
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48-1-5. Partnership property.
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, or subsequently
acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the partnership, is partnership property.
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership
funds is partnership property.
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title
so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though without
words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor, unless a contrary
intent appears.
History: L. 1921, c h . 89, § 8; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 69-1-5.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Conveyances, Title
57, Chapter 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Evidence.
— Burden of proof.
— Presumptions.
Existence of partnership.
Cited.
Evidence.
— B u r d e n of proof.
In action for accounting and dissolution of
partnership, plaintiff had burden of proving
existence of partnership. Benson v. Rozzelle, 85
Utah 582, 39 P.2d 1113 (1934).
— Presumptions.
The fact that two persons share profits of a
business raises a presumption that they are
partners. Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189,
259 P. 313 (1927).
Where payment of a portion of profits to defendant constituted partial reimbursement for
defendant's expenditures in connection with
the business premises, there was no presumption of partnership, and plaintiff was required
to meet his burden of proof without the aid of
the presumption. Koesling v. Basamakis, 539
P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975).
E x i s t e n c e of p a r t n e r s h i p .
Evidence held insufficient to show t h a t a
partnership was ever formed, but did show that
a business arrangement was entered into that

constituted a preliminary to a partnership.
Millett v. Langston, 8 Utah 2d 15, 327 P.2d 253
(1958).
Where defendant had turned over operation
of tavern, equipment, furnishing, and inventory that he owned to plaintiff pursuant to an
agreement to divide profits from the business
equally, plaintiff had full authority to manage
the business, including purchase of supplies,
payment of bills, and keeping of books, and income from the business was reported on partnership income tax forms, trial court could
properly find that a partnership existed, entitling plaintiff to half the compensation paid for
disruption of business upon condemnation of
the building where the tavern was located.
Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975).
Evidence established the existence of a partnership where two parties entered into an
agreement requiring them to work together to
obtain a zoning change and to develop land,
and providing for sharing the profits derived
from their joint efforts; classification of the
project as a single undertaking rather t h a n a
continuous business transaction did not render
the trial court's finding of a partnership erroneous. Nupetco Assocs. v. J e n k i n s , 669 P.2d
877 (Utah 1983) (decided before enactment of
§ 48-1-3.1).
Cited in Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

ANALYSIS

Assignment for benefit of creditors.
Death of partner.
Property purchased with partnership funds.
Security for loan.
A s s i g n m e n t for benefit of creditors.
Assignment of property of partnership for
benefit of its creditors is not rendered invalid
by noninclusion therein of individual property
of each partner. Wilson v. Sullivan, 17 Utah
341, 53 P. 994 (1898).
D e a t h of partner.
In suit by surviving partner against widow
of deceased partner to recover title to certain
real property held in the name of defendant,
evidence held sufficient to require such land to
be held in trust for partnership. Matson v.
Matson, 56 Utah 394, 190 P. 943 (1920).
Property p u r c h a s e d with partnership
funds.
Property purchased with partnership funds

Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 329 to 356.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 69.

A.L.R. — Insurance on life of partner as
partnership asset, 56 A.L.R.3d 892.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=> 67.

C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S Partnership § 1.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 1 to 26.

59A Am. J u r . 2d Partner-
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S e c u r i t y for l o a n .
Where partnership money was loaned and
note and mortgage securing the indebtedness
were taken in name of partner, note and mortgage were property of partnership so that partner could not be charged with amount of loan
upon dissolution of partnership. Buzianis v.
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d.
ship §§ 1 to 4.

is prima facie the property of the firm, though
the title is taken in the individual name of one
or more of the partners. Deming v. Moss, 40
Utah 501, 121 P. 971 (1912); Staats v. Staats,
63 Utah 470, 226 P. 667 (1924).
Although two partners entered into a contract in their individual names to purchase
lands, assignments of the contract referred to
these buyers as individuals, the property was
referred to as t h a t of the individuals by name
in the trial, and the parties submitted memorandums concerning the issue of cotenancy,
nevertheless the partnership was the purchaser because of the use of partnership funds.
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976).
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48-1-6. Partner agent of partnership as to partnership
business.
(1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership
name of any instrument for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business of the partnership of which he is a member, binds the partnership,
unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership
in the particular matter and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the
business of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership,
unless authorized by the other partners.
(3) Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they have abandoned
the business, one or more but less than all of the partners have no authority
to:
(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for creditors or on the
assignee's promise to pay the debts of the partnership.
(b) Dispose of the good will of the business.
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to carry on the
ordinary business of the partnership.
(d) Confess a judgment.
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference.
(4) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority shall
bind the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction.

h a s no power to bind partnership in transaction which is not within ordinary or apparent
scope of partnership business, and person dealing with such partner is charged with notice of
such fact. Peterson v. Armstrong, 24 Utah 96,
66 P. 767 (1901).
As between partnership and person dealing
with one of its members in good faith, without
notice, it is immaterial whether partner acts
fairly with his copartners in transaction, so
i
L
*
*ur
L
Vlong as he acts within scope of partnership
business and his authority. Salt Lake City
Brewing Co. v. Hawke, 24 Utah 199, 66 P.
1058 (1901).
.
— B o r r o w i n g money.
When money is borrowed by partner on
credit of partnership, according to usual course
of its business and within general scope of its
authority, partnership is liable for money thus
borrowed. Salt Lake City Brewing Co. v.
Hawke, 24 Utah 199, 66 P. 1058 (1901).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

power to bind his associates by engagements
with third persons to extent that member of
trading or commercial firm may do. Bentley v.
Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908).

Burden of proof.
Common-law mining partnership.
Duties of partners inter se.
Manner of entering into transaction.
Power of individual partner to bind partnership
Borrowing money.
— Conveyance of property.
— Nontrading partnership.

D u t i e s of p a r t n e r s i n t e r se.
Partners stand in fiduciary relation to each
other, and it is duty of each partner to observe
utmost good faith towards his copartners in all
dealings and transactions that come within
scope of partnership business. Nelson v.
Matsch, 38 Utah 122, 110 P. 865, 1912D Ann.
Cas. 1242 (1910).

B u r d e n of proof.
Plaintiff, whose action was based on transaction with individual partner that was not
within ordinary or apparent scope of partnership business, had burden of showing either
that partner had special authority in matter or
that transaction was ratified by other partners
whom plaintiff sought to hold liable. Peterson
v. Armstrong, 24 Utah 96, 66 P. 767 (1901).

M a n n e r of e n t e r i n g i n t o t r a n s a c t i o n .
Where transaction by one partner is for benefit of partnership and is within general or apparent scope of its business, it is immaterial
that such partner's name alone is signed to
writing that evidences transaction. Salt Lake
City Brewing Co. v. Hawke, 24 Utah 199, 66 P.
1058 (1901).

Common-law mining partnership.
An important distinction between ordinary
trading partnership and mining partnership is
that member of mining partnership has not the

P o w e r of i n d i v i d u a l p a r t n e r t o b i n d p a r t nership.
Partner, without special authority in matter,
14

— C o n v e y a n c e of property.
Where the title to real property is in the
name of one or more or all of the partners, or of
a third person in trust for the partnership, a
conveyance executed by a partner in the partnership name, or in his own name, passes the
equitable interest of the partnership, provided
t h e act is
T w i t h i n t h e a " t h , o r i t y o f t h e Pf1*J
ner und r the
*
P™™\°™ of Subsection (1). Billl n ^ V Q O C " ° n * n i Fn L * d £ n [* ? T a « *'
Inc.), 92 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988).
—Nontrading p a r t n e r s h i p .
Where partnership is engaged in stage business, or carrying of mails, passengers, and express, one of partners has, prima facie, no authority to bind firm or another partner by
transaction relating to business of mining, and
he who would seek to hold firm liable by virtue
0 f such transaction has burden of showing authority in contracting partner to enter into it.
Cavanaugh v. Salisbury, 22 Utah 465, 63 P. 39
(1900).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 249 to 251.
C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 136.

48-1-7.

History: L. 1921, c h . 89, § 9; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 69-1-6.

48-1-7

A.L.R. — Vicarious liability of attorney for
tort of partner in law firm, 70 A.L.R.3d 1298.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 125.

Conveyance of real property of partnership.

Where title to real property is in the partnership name, any partner may
convey title to such property by a conveyance executed in the partnership
name; but the partnership may recover such property, unless the partner's act
binds the partnership under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1), or unless such
property has been conveyed by the grantee or a person claiming through such
grantee to a holder for value without knowledge that the partner in making
the conveyance has exceeded his authority.
Where title to real property is in the name of the partnership a conveyance
executed by a partner in his own name passes the equitable interest of the
partnership, provided the act is one within the authority of the partner under
the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1).
Where title to real property is in the name of one or more but not all of the
partners, and the record does not disclose the right of the partnership, the
partners in whose name the title stands may convey title to such property, but
the partnership may recover such property, if the partners' act does not bind
the partnership under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1), unless the purchaser or his assignee is a holder for value without knowledge.
Where the title to real property is in the name of one or more or all of the
partners, or in a third person in trust for the partnership, a conveyance executed by a partner in the partnership name, or in his own name, passes the
equitable interest of the partnership, provided the act is one within the authority of the partner under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1).
Where the title to real property is in the names of all the partners a conveyance executed by all the partners passes all their rights in such property.
15
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H i s t o r y : L. 1921, c h . 89, § 10; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-7.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Conveyances, Title
57, Chapter 1

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Equitable interest
Cited
Equitable interest.
Where the title to real property is in the
name of one or more or all of the partners, or of
a third person ,n trust for the partnership, a
conveyance executed by a partner in the part-

nership name, or in his own name, passes the
equitable interest of the partnership, provided
t n e a c t 1S o n e w , t h i n the authority of the partn e r under the provisions of § 48-1-6(1) Bill» n g 9 v Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd (In re Granada,
Inc ), 92 Bankr 501 (Bankr D Utah 1988)

48-1-10.

Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act.

Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his
copartners loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the
partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to
the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
H i s t o r y : L. 1921, ch. 89, § 13; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 6 9 1 1 0 .
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in Gary Energy Corp v Metro Oil
Prods , 114 F R D 69 (D U t a h 1987)

48-1-12

Cited in Rogers v. M O Bitner Co , 738 P 2d
1029 (Utah 1987)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am J u r 2d Partnership §§ 304 to 308

48-1-8.

C.J.S. — 68 C J S Partnership § 154
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership *=» 138

Partnership bound by admission of partner.

An admission or representation made hy any partner concerning partnership affairs within the scope of his authority as conferred by this chapter is
evidence against the partnership.
H i s t o r y : L. 1921, c h . 89, § 11; R S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-8.

Cross-References.

—

Party

admission,

Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2)
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am J u r 2d Partnership §§ 754 to 757, 939

48-1-9.

C.J.S. — 68 C J S Partnership § 167
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership *= 152

Partnership charged with knowledge of or notice
to partner.

Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and the
knowledge of the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while a
partner or then present to his mind, and the knowledge of any other partner
who reasonably could and should have communicated it to the acting partner,
operates as notice to or knowledge of the partnership, except in the case of a
fraud on the partnership committed by or with the consent of that partner.
H i s t o r y : L. 1921, c h . 89, § 12; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-9.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d — 59A Am J u r 2d Partnership §§ 252 to 256

C . J . S . — 68 C J S Partnership § 175
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=> 159
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Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am J u r 2d Partnership §§ 647 to 661, 667 to 672
C . J . S . — 68 C J . S Partnership §§ 168 to
171
A.L.R. — Vicarious liability of attorney for
tort of partner in law firm, 70 A L R 3d 1298

48-1-11.

Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses, or
allied criminal fraud by a partner, 82 A L R 3d
822
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=> 153(1)

Partnership bound by partner's breach of trust.

The partnership is bound to make good the loss:
(1) where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority
receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and,
(2) where the partnership in the course of its business receives money
or property of a third person and the money or property so received is
misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the partnership
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 14; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-11.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. J u r 2d Partnership §§ 662 to 666

C.J.S. — 68 C J S Partnership § 169
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 153(2)

48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability.
All partners are liable:
(1) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership
under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11.
(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; but
any partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership
contract.
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H i s t o r y : L. 1921, c h . 89, 5 15; R.S. 1933 &
: . 1943, 69-1-12.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Joint and several liability.
Parties.
Satisfaction of debts.
Service on partners.
Cited.
J o i n t a n d s e v e r a l liability.
Where partners failed to comply with the former Utah Limited Partnership Act. they were
liable as general partners and were jointly and
severally liable for a partial failure of consideration paid by the partnership for stock.
Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 265 F.2d
227 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 360 U.S. 932, 79 S.
Ct. 1452, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1545 (1959).
Where a right of recovery, in a stockholder's
derivative action against a life insurance company, was based on the fraud of the directors in
acting both as directors and as members of the
partnership that organized the company, the
liability of the directors was joint and several.
Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 170 F. Supp.
150 (D. Utah 1958), afTd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.),
cert, denied, 360 U.S. 932, 79 S. Ct. 1452, 3 L.
Ed. 2d 1545 (1959).

an alleged claim of only an individual obligation and recovery had against him on proof of a
partnership obligation not qualifying under
Subsection (1) of this section as a joint and several obligation, but coming under Subsection
(2) as only a joint obligation, unless the partnership or all the members thereof are made
parties. Palle v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Utah
47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222 (1932).
S a t i s f a c t i o n of d e b t s .
Partnership debts and obligations coming
within the scope of Subsection (2) must be satisfied by partnership assets to the extent any
exist before a creditor can seek satisfaction
from the individual assets of a partner.
McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Tel., 758
P.2d 914 (Utah 1988).
S e r v i c e on p a r t n e r s .
If a partner's liability is joint r a t h e r t h a n
joint and several, each defendant must be individually served in order to be liable. Barber v.
Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah
1990).
Cited in First Sec. Bank v. Felger, 658 F.
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987); Billings v. Key
Bank (In re Granada, Inc.), 115 Bankr. 702
(Bankr. D. Utah 1990).

Parties.
An individual member may not be sued on
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(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were an
actual member of the partnership.
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly with the
other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or representation as to
incur liability; otherwise, separately.
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an existing
partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is an agent of
the persons consenting to such representation to bind them to the same extent
and in the same manner as though he were a partner in fact, with respect to
persons who rely upon the representation. Where all the members of an existing partnership consent to the representation, a partnership act or obligation
results; but in all other cases it is the joint act or obligation of the person
acting and the persons consenting to the representation.
H i s t o r y : L. 1921, c h . 88, § 18; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-13.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Requisites.
There was no partnership or joint adventure
by estoppel where one of the two alleged joint
adventures had not given his consent to being
held out as a joint adventurer with the person
making the representation, and where the
third person to whom the representation had
been made had not relied upon it. Bates v.
Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952).
Partnership liability to mechanics' lienors
was found where defendant had stated to
others that he was or intended to become another's partner, and where he paid for a part of

the material used and was present during the
delivery and use of construction materials on
the premises. Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6
Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517 (1957).
Defendant was not liable as a partner in an
enterprise by estoppel even though payment
for goods was made by check on the account of
defendant, defendant was sometimes listed as
a purchaser on the sales invoices, and defendant filed applications for licenses to engage in
business with the state tax commission. Phillips Mfg. Co. v. Putnam, 29 Utah 2d 69, 504
P.2d 1376(1973).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
damages for wrongful act of copartner, 14
A.L.R.4th 1335.
Partnership or joint venture exclusion in
contractor's or other similar comprehensive
general liability insurance policy, 57 A.L.R.4th
1155.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 165.

Am. J u r . 2d. - - 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 638 to 672.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 180.
A.L.R. — Vicarious liability of attorney for
tort of partner in law firm, 70 A.L.R.3d 1298.
Derivative liability of partner for punitive

48-1-13.

Partner by estoppel.

(1) When a person by words spoken or written or by conduct represents
himself, or consents to another's representing him, to anyone as a partner, in
an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is
liable to any such person to whom such representation has been made who has
on the faith of such representation given credit to the actual or apparent
partnership, and, if he has made such representation or consented to its being
made in a public manner, he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit
by, or with the knowledge of, the apparent partner making the representation
or consenting to its being made.
18

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 145 to 147, 673 to 697.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 21.

Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 24, 33 to
38.

48-1-14. Liability of incoming partner.
A person admitted as a partner into an existing partnership is liable for all
the obligations of the partnership arising before his admission as if he had
been a partner when such obligations were incurred, except that his liability
shall be satisfied only out of partnership property.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 17; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-14.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 914 to 919, 933.

C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 256.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 238.
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Rules d e t e r m i n i n g rights a n d d u t i e s of p a r t n e r s .

The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be
determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules:
(1) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of
capital or advances to the partnership property, and share equally in the
v
••* profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; and must contribute towards the losses, whether of
capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share
in the profits.
(2) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the
ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its
business or property.
(3) A partner who in aid of the partnership makes any payment or
advance beyond the amount of capital which he agreed to contribute shall
be paid interest from the date of the payment or advance.
(4) A partner shall receive interest on the capital contributed by him
only from the date when repayment should be made.
(5) All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of
the partnership business.
(6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership
business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs.
(7) No person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners.
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the
partnership business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no
act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be done
rightfully without the consent of all the partners.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 18; U.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 09-1-15.

ANALYSIS
Existence of partnership.
Gifts to members of family.
Remuneration to partner for services.
Repayment of contributions.
Sharing profits and losses.
E x i s t e n c e of p a r t n e r s h i p .
An organization of workers, formed for the
purpose of performing and undertaking contracts for bricklaying jobs, did not have the essential elements of either a general or limited
partnership where all the equipment used by
workers belonged to one individual who had
sole authority to make contracts for himself
and the organization, and where workers were
not entitlod to share in profits equally or on
any fixed percentage basis, were not chargeable for losses, and were not permitted to de-

termine the means or methods of operating.
Johanson Bros. Bldrs. v. Board of Review, 118
Utah 384, 222 P.2d 563 (1950).
Gifts to m e m b e r s of family.
Where father intended at the time of dissolution of family partnership to make a gift to his
son and wife of certain amounts of the capital
contributions he had made to the partnership,
a n d i n t e n d e d that such gift be accomplished by
e a c h p a r t n e r ' s sharing according to respective
p a r t n e r s h i p interests in the total assets of the
p a r t n e r s h i p including the contributions made
by the father
such

gifl

v

West
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R e p a y m e n t of c o n t r i b u t i o n s .
Upon dissolution and distribution of partnership assets, this section does not authorize the
deduction of depreciation from advances made
for capital improvements in repayment of the
partners' contributions, and trial court erred
when it ordered such deduction for depreciation because the partnership agreement did
not authorize such deduction and to allow the
deduction would produce an unjust result.
Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66 (Utah 1981).
S h a r i n g p r o f i t s a n d losses.
Although obligation to share losses is not directly expressed in partnership agreement,
generally agreement to share profits, nothing
being said about losses, amounts prima facie to
agreement to share losses also. Bentley v.
Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908).
In absence of agreement or proof of agreement to contrary, partners will divide profits
and losses equally. Kimball v. McCornick, 70
Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r .
ship §§ 409
C.J.S. —
A.L.R. —

to copartner on sale of partnership interest to
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership *= 70.

2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerto 418, 469 to 475.
68 C.J.S. Partnership § 76.
Partner's breach of fiduciary duty

Partnership books.

The partnership books shall be kept, subject to any agreement between the
partners, at the principal place of business of the partnership, and every
partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy any of
them.
H i s t o r y : L. 1921, c h . 89, ft 19; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-16.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 91.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=> 80.

A m . J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 962 to 967.

on

between the parties
Subsection (1) of this section. West
U t a h 2 d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965).

the

superseded

and the other partners relied

In the absence of an agreement providing for
remuneration, partner was not entitled to remuneration for services rendered while acting
in the partnership business. Nupetco Assocs. v.
Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983).

to the partners' wages or compensation, it was
not error for the trial court to exclude evidence
t h a t one partner did more work than the other,
for partners receive no compensation for action
in the partnership business (other than splitting the profits) unless there is an agreement
or provision for such remuneration. Keller v.
Wixom, 123 U t a h 103, 255 P.2d 118 (1953).
Generally, a partner is not entitled to any
remuneration for his services in the absence of
an agreement by the partners to that effect.
Chambers v. Sims, 13 Utah 2d 371, 374 P.2d
841 (1962).
Where the partnership agreement or a specific practice, acquiesced in by the partners,
contemplates the payment of salary to one or
more partners, but no amounts are specified, it
is presumed t h a t payment of reasonable salaries is intended. Chambers v. Sims, 13 Utah 2d
371, 374 P.2d 841 (1962).
While generally a partner is not entitled to
any remuneration for his services while acting
in the partnership business in the absence of a
partnership agreement providing for such remuneration, such an agreement for remuneration may be either expressed or implied.
Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66 (Utah 1981).

48-1-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

agreement

R e m u n e r a t i o n t o p a r t n e r for s e r v i c e s .
Where partners had made no agreement as

20
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48-1-17.

GENERAL PARTNERSHIP

PARTNERSHIP

Duty of partners to render information.

Partners shall render on demand true and full information of all things
affecting the partnership to any partner, or the legal representatives of any
deceased partner, or partner under legal disability.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 20; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-17.

is fiduciary, that of trustee and cestui que
trust, and this fiduciary relationship exists between surviving partner and legal representative of deceased partner. Sharp v. Sharp, 54
Utah 262, 180 P. 580 (1919).
S e c r e t profits.
Member of partnership will not be permitted

48-1-19

to take advantage of any secret agreement to
receive private or personal gain for work or
business carried on by partnership. Paggi v.
Skliris, 54 Utah 88, 179 P. 739 (1919).
Cited in Billings v. Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd.
(In re Granada, Inc.), 92 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
NOTES TO DECISIONS
P a r t n e r acquiring other partner's interest.
Partner's failure to disclose voluntarily to
the other partner the value of the other partner's limited partnership interest before acquiring such interest from him was not a
breach of fiduciary duty where the other part-

ner managed and kept the financial records of
the primary partnership asset and had ample
access to information about the value of his
interest. Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah
1982).

48-1-19.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r .
ship §§ 409
C.J.S. —
A.L.R. —

48-1-18.

2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnerto 410, 425.
68 C.J.S. Partnership § 76.
Partner's breach of fiduciary duty

to copartner on sale of partnership interest to
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122.
K e y N u m b e r s . — Partnership *= 70.

Partner accountable as a

fiduciary.

Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits, derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased partner engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal
representatives of the last surviving partner.
History: L. 1921, c h . 89, § 2 1 ; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-18.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
,
v
Employees actions.
Partnership income.
Relations inter se.
Secret profits.
Cited.
c
,
,
.
Employee s actions.
Where employee of one member of a group of
joint adventurers seeking to buy and sell certain contiguous lands having valuable clay deposits discovers clay on other adjoining land,
obtains op ion thereon, and enters into a contract with the group for a share of the proceeds
and upon consideration of his option being
turned over to the group, his employer is not
chargeable with breach of trust toward other

22

original adventurers for failing to inform them
of employee's discovery until after he obtained
o p t i o n L a n e v p e r s o n , 68 Utah 585, 251 P.
374 (1926)
Partnership income.
Where partnership was organized for purpose of furnishing supplies to laborers em,
d b
r a m J ,. h t
a
and one
t n e r w a s to act ag t r e a s u r e r a n d furnish a „
forejgn

]abor on construction

h e w a s to r e c d v e in fuH
net

fitg

furnishi
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was

work> for
nt one

of p a r t n e r s h i
labor

Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 420 to 426.
C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 76, 378.
A.L.R. — Partner's breach of fiduciary duty
to copartner on sale of partnership interest to
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122.
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R e l a t i o n s i n t e r se.
The relation of partners between themselves

Civil liability of one partner to another or to
the partnership based on partner's personal
purchase of partnership property during existence of partnership, 37 A.L.R.4th 494.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 81.

Right to an account.

Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to partnership
affairs:
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or possession of its property by his copartners.
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement.
(3) As provided by Section 48-1-18.
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, ft 22; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-19.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action for accounting.
Estates of decedents.
Statute of limitations.
Action for accounting.
Before one partner can compel another partner to pay what is claimed to be indebtedness
to partnership, it must be first ascertained t h a t
amount owed by debtor partner is greater
amount t h a n he would be entitled to receive
upon striking balance and finding interest of
each partner in assets of partnership; aggrieved parties must bring action for accounting r a t h e r than action on claimed debt.
Bankers' Trust Co. v. Riter, 56 Utah 525, 190
P. 1113 (1920).
Estates of decedents.
Administrator of deceased partner held entitled to maintain an action against heirs of another partner for general accounting of partnership affairs, where it appeared t h a t accounting was necessary, coupled with additional fact that estate of other partner had
been closed and personal representative re-

leased from further duty in administration of
estate. Bankers' Trust Co. v. Riter, 56 Utah
525, 190 P. 1113 (1920).
Where a deceased partner's daughter, who
acted as one of the personal representatives of
her father's estate, had held the partnership
assets in trust for the surviving partner and
had control of her father's accounts and the
records of those accounts before she died, the
estate had the burden of (1) proving which accounts were partnership accounts and which
were not, (2) identifying the source of the funds
contained in nonpartnership accounts if possible, and (3) proving that the funds which had
been in partnership accounts and had been removed from those accounts by the personal representatives had been adequately accounted
for. In re Estate of Harris, 728 P.2d 1003 (Utah
1986).
S t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s .
In action against executors for accounting
based on partnership between plaintiff and deceased, evidence was insufficient to show that
cause of action was barred by statute of limitations so that court erred in nonsuiting plaintiff.
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48-1-20

Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 P. 313
(1927).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J i i r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 9G8 to 970.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 378, 379.
A.L.R. — When statute of limitations com-
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mences to run on right of partnership accounting, 44 A.L.R.4th 678.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership <s=> 81.

Continuation of partnership beyond fixed term.

When a partnership for a fixed term or particular undertaking is continued
after the termination of such term or particular undertaking without any
express agreement, the rights and duties of the partners remain the same as
they were at such termination so far as is consistent with a partnership at
will.
A continuation of the business by the partners, or such of them as
habitually acted therein during the term, without any settlement or liquidation of the partnership affairs, is prima facie evidence of a continuation of the
partnership.

right to possess such property for any other purpose without the consent
of his partners.
(b) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable,
except in connection with the assignment of rights of all the partners in
the same property.
(c) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to
attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership.
When partnership property is attached for a partnership debt, the partners, or any of them, or the representative of a deceased partner, cannot
claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws.
(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific partnership property
vests in the surviving partner or partners, except where the deceased was
the last surviving partner, when his right in such property vests in his
legal representatives. Such surviving partner or partners, or the legal
representatives of the last surviving partner, has no right to possess the
partnership property for any but a partnership purpose.
(e) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to
dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, heirs or next of kin.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 25; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-22.

H i s t o r y : L. 1921, c h . 89, § 23; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 89 to 95.

48-1-21.

C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 64, 350.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership *= 60, 259.

Extent of property rights of a partner.

The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights in specific partnership
property, (2) his interest in the partnership and (3) his right to participate in
the management.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 24; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-21.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership § 383.

48-1-22.

C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 16, 85.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 76, 79.

Nature of a partner's right in specific partnership
property.

( D A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property
holding as a tenant in partnership.
(2) The incidents of this tenancy are such that:
(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this chapter and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but he has no
24

48-1-22

incidents of a new tenancy, t h a t of a "tenant in
partnership." In re Ostler's Estate, 4 Utah 2d
47, 286 P.2d 796 (1955).

ANALYSIS

Divorce settlement.
Individual property.
New tenancy.
Right of marital distributive share.
Divorce settlement.
Neither a partner nor his ex-wife could forceB
a sale of specific partnership property for purposes of a property settlement pursuant to a»
divorce. Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah1
1981).
Individual property.
Evidence supported a finding that certain re-alty was not partnership property, whichl
would have made it exempt from a judgmentt
lien, where the parties treated the land as thes
individual property of the partners and not as3
partnership property. Frandsen v. Holladay,»
739 P.2d 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
N e w tenancy.
This section sets forth with particularity thei

Right of marital d i s t r i b u t i v e s h a r e .
Courts t h a t have considered the changes
brought about by the adoption of the Uniform
Partnership Act have concluded that the legislative intention was to enact the English rule
and have, with the exception of one state, held
that marital rights in specific partnership
property have been excluded by the act. In re
Ostler's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 47, 286 P.2d 796
(1955).
Through the Uniform Partnership Act the
Legislature intended to adopt the English rule
of conversion of real property into personalty
when it is partnership property. Hence, as to
partnership real property, the wife of a partner
would not have a marital interest. In re
Ostler's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 47, 286 P.2d 796
(1955).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
tenses, or allied criminal fraud by a partner, 82
A.L.R.3d 822.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 68.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 384, 401 to 404.
C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 72, 73.
A.L.R. — Embezzlement, larceny, false pre-
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48-1-23. Nature of partner's interest in the partnership.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

48-1-23

A partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal property.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 26; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-23.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
ship §§ 385
C.J.S. —
A.L.R. —

48-1-24.

2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partneror medical partnership for purposes of division
to 387.
of property in divorce proceedings, 74 A.L.R.3d
68 C.J.S. Partnership § 85.
621.
Evaluation of interest in law
firm
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=> 76.

Assignment of partner's interest.

A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not of
itself dissolve the partnership, or, as against the other partners in the absence
of agreement, entitle the assignee during the continuance of the partnership
to interfere in the management or administration of the partnership business
or affairs, or to require any information or account of partnership transactions, or to inspect the partnership books; but it merely entitles the assignee
to receive in accordance with his contract the profits to which the assigning
partner would otherwise be entitled.
In case of a dissolution of a partnership, the assignee is entitled to receive
his assignor's interest, and may require an account from the date only of the
last account agreed to by all the partners.

Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 833 to 837, 970.
C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 102, 103,
244, 245.
A.L.R. — Partner's breach of fiduciary duty

48-1-25.

to copartner on sale of partnership interest to
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122.
Key Numbers. — Partnership «= 95, 226,
227.

Partner's interest subject to charging order.

(1) On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a
partner the court which entered the judgment, order or decree, or any other
court, may charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the
unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon and may then
or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits and of any other money
due or to "fell due to him in respect of the partnership, and make aii other
orders, directions, accounts and inquiries which the debtor partner might
have made or which the circumstances of the case may require.
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time before foreclosure,
or, in case of a sale being directed by the court, may be purchased without
thereby causing a dissolution:
(a) with separate property, by any one or more of the partners; or,
(b) with partnership property, by any one or more of the partners with
the consent of all the partners whose interests are not so charged or sold.
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be held to deprive a partner of his right, if
any, under the exemption laws as regards his interest in the partnership.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, 9 28; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-25.

History: L. 1921, ch. 89, $ 27; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-24.

48-1-26

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Exemptions gener
ally, Title 78, Chapter 23.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

ters' interests in partnership, written in terms
of present purchase and present determination
,
. , .,
,
.
, . ,
off value, but the purchase price ofr which was
.
,,
.., ,
, •_. ,
,
...
n
° ?***hX* UntlX d e ™ n d e d b ? v e n d o r s > d » d
not freeze the price of the interests sold at the
time contract was made, where the purchase
P r i c e w a s not demanded until 1960 and the
business had grown in financial value with the
benefit of vendors' continuing capital investment, and where, over the years, losses on
sales and charitable deductions had been allocated pro rata to the owners, including vendors, vendors were named co-owners on tax returns, and $27,000 in accumulated profits belonging to vendors had been retained by the
partnership as working capital. Bullough v.
Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965).

^
,
,.
Common-law mining partnership.
mor . r
L r • i
L
— Ciiieci oi assignment of interest.
Contract to transfer partnership interests.
Common-law mining partnership.
— Effect of a s s i g n m e n t of i n t e r e s t .
A principal distinction between ordinary
trading partnership and mining partnership is
that member of mining partnership may assign his interest without consent of his copartners, and the assignment does not work dissolution of partnership. Bentley v. Brossard, 33
Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908).
C o n t r a c t to t r a n s f e r p a r t n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t s .
A 1932 contract between general partners
and their brothers and sisters for sale of lat-
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Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 790 to 795.

48-1-26.

C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 189
Key Numbers. — Partnership «=» 181.

"Dissolution" defined.

The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on, as distinguished from the winding up, of the business.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, 5 29; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-26.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
of action or suit against the other. Kimball v.
McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927).

Effect of dissolution.
Dissolution does not, in itself, necessarily
give either of the parties an immediate cause
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 808 to 810.

48-1-27.

C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 331.
Key Numbers. — Partnership *=» 261.

History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 30; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-27.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
In general.
Cited

In general
Where a partner's conduct constituted acts of
dissolution, the partnership was not thus terminated and its affairs had to be wound up.
The services of an accountant in preparing an
account of the partnership's business should

have been paid for by the partnership.
Pantages v. Arge, 1 Utah 2d 105, 262 P.2d 745
(1953).
A partnership at will was not terminated
when one
P a r t n e r notified the other he was
f.nd'h"R . t h e P " 4 ™ ^ * ' " « » «P«U«| M">.from
? M £ 7 ^ 9 5 7 ) ™ V'
Cited in McCune & McCune v. Mountain
Bell Tel., 758 P.2d 914 (Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 889.

C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 351.
Key Numbers. — Partnership «=» 277.

C a u s e s of dissolution.

Dissolution is caused:
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners:
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking specified in the agreement.
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or
particular undertaking is specified.
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned
their interests, or suffered them to be charged for their separate
debts, either before or after the termination of any specified term or
particular undertaking.
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in
accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement between
the partners.
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the
circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of
this section, by the express will of any partner at any time.
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the partnership to be carried on or for the members to carry it on in partnership.
(4) By the death of any partner.
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership.
28
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(6) By decree of court under Section 48-1-29.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, J 31; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-28.

P a r t n e r s h i p not t e r m i n a t e d by dissolution.

On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the
winding up of partnership affairs is completed.

48-1-28.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
,_
.
.
,.
^ D e X X a r t n e ? * Partner8h,P'
Remedy for expulsion of one partner by an0 (; n e r

Remedy for expulsion of one partner by
another.
Where, under a partnership at will, one partr
™ fraudulently expelled another partner from
the partnership, the remedy was an accounting
of the partnership profits, based upon an assumption of a continued partnership with full
participation in profits according to the partn e r g h i p agreement, at least for the period from
t h e w r o n ^ u l expulsion to actual dissolution by
c i r c u m g t a n c e 8 o r d e c r e e o f c o u r t G r a h a m v.

Common-Iaw mining partnership.
—Death of partner.
An important distinction between an ordinary trading partnership and a mining partnership is that the death of a member of a mm-

*•* 2 utah 2d 144> 2 7 ° p 2d 456 < 1954)

S! £££&. ^rlZSS^t*
396, 94 P. 736 (1908).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 815 to 871.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 330 to
349.

Key Numbers. — Partnership «=> 259V2 to
276.

48-1-29. Dissolution by decree of court.
(1) On application by or for a partner the court shall decree a dissolution
whenever:
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial proceeding or
is shown to be of unsound mind.
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of performing his
part of the partnership contract.
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business.
(d) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to
the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on
the business in partnership with him.
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss.
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
(2) On the application of the purchaser of a partner's interest under Section
48-1-24 or 48-1-25:
(a) After the termination of the specified term or particular undertaking.
(b) At any time, if the partnership was a partnership at will, when the
interest was assigned or when the charging order was issued.
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History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 32; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-29.

48-1-31.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Accounting.
Judgment, order or decree.
Jurisdiction.
Not reasonably practicable.
Accounting.
In a suit for the dissolution of a partnership
the trial court has discretion to order an accounting Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah 363,
145 P 2 d 780 (1944).
J u d g m e n t , o r d e r or d e c r e e .
Although judgment ordering dissolution of a
partnership was void because there was no evidence of a partnership as alleged by plaintiff,
such judgment was final judgment from which
appeal could be taken Benson v Rozzelle, 85
Utah 582, 39 P 2d 1113 (1934)

Jurisdiction.
Where there was no evidence of a threeparty partnership as alleged By plaintiff in action for dissolution of partnership, court was
without jurisdiction to order dissolution, since
no partnership existed. Benson v. Rozzelle, 85
Utah 582, 39 P.2d 1113 (1934).
Not reasonably practicable.
Partner's conduct, in keeping the books and
records contrary to agreement and using partnership funds for private purposes, regardless
of his intent, provided more than ample support for the conclusion that it was no longer
reasonably practicable or equitable for parties
to continue their partnership business, rendering dissolution appropriate. Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —- 59A Am J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 847 to 871.
C.J.S. — 68 C J.S. Partnership §§ 338, 339,
349
A.L.R. — Inability of partnership to operate
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at profit as justification for court-ordered dissolution, 20 A.L.R.4th 122.
Key Numbers. — Partnership «=» 267, 273,
274.

General effect of dissolution on authority of partner.

Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to
complete transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all
authority of any partner to act for the partnership.
(1) With respect to the partners:
(a) when the dissolution is not by the act, bankruptcy or death of a
partner; or,
(b) when the dissolution is by such act, bankruptcy or death of a
partner in cases where Section 48-1-31 so requires.
(2) With respect to persons not partners as declared in Section 48-1-32.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 33; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-30.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partner
ship §§ 934 to 944.

C.J.S.
68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 354 to
362.
Key Numbers. — Partnership <s= 278.
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Right of partner to contribution from copartners
after dissolution.

Where the dissolution is caused by the act, death or bankruptcy of a partner
each partner is liable to his copartners for his share of any liability created by
any partner acting for the partnership as if the partnership had not been
dissolved unless:
(1) The dissolution being by act of any partner, the partner acting for
the partnership had knowledge of the dissolution, or,
(2) The dissolution being by the death or bankruptcy of a partner, the
partner acting for the partnership had knowledge or notice of the death or
bankruptcy.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 34; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-31.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 935.

48-1-32.

C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 359
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership <s=> 283

Power of partner to bind partnership to third persons after dissolution.

(1) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership, except as provided
in paragraph (3):
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or completing transactions unfinished at dissolution.
(b) By any transaction which would bind the partnership, if dissolution
had not taken place, provided the other party to the transaction:
1st Had extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution and
had no knowledge or notice of the dissolution; or,
2nd Though he had not so extended credit, had nevertheless known
of the partnership prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or
notice of dissolution, the fact of dissolution had not been advertised in
a newspaper of general circulation in the place (or in each place, if
more than one) at which the partnership business was regularly carried on.
(2) The liability of a partner under paragraph (1Kb) shall be satisfied out of
partnership assets alone when such partner had been prior to dissolution:
(a) unknown as a partner to the person with whom the contract is
made; and,
(b) so far unknown and inactive in partnership affairs that the business reputation of the partnership could not be said to have been in any
degree due to his connection with it.
(3) The partnership is in no case bound by any act of a partner after dissolution:
(a) where the partnership is dissolved because it is unlawful to carry on
the business, unless the act is appropriate for winding up partnership
affairs; or,
(b) where the partner has become bankrupt; or,
31
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(c) where the partner has no authority to wind up partnership affairs;
except by a transaction with one who:
1st Had extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution and
had no knowledge or notice of his want of authority; or,
2nd Had not extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution,
and, having no knowledge or notice of his want of authority, the fact
of his want of authority has not been advertised in the manner provided for advertising the fact of dissolution in paragraph (1Kb) 2nd.
(4) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability under Section 48-1-13 of
any person who after dissolution represents himself or consents to another's
representing him as a partner in a partnership engaged in carrying on business.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

H i s t o r y : L. 1921, c h . 89, § 35; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-32.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 936 to 961.

48-1-33.

C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 354 to
362.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 278, 279.

Effect of dissolution on partner's existing liability.

(1) The dissolution of a partnership does not of itself discharge the existing
liability of any partner.
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon dissolution of the
partnership by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership
creditor and the person or partnership continuing the business; and such
agreement may be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor
having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership continuing
the business.
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved
partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of
the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of
payment of such obligations.
(4) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for all
obligations of the partnership incurred while he was a partner, but subject to
the prior payment of his separate debts.
H i s t o r y : L. 1921, ch. 89, § 36; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-33.
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A g r e e m e n t by third person to assume oblig a t i o n s required.
Under this statute there must be an assumption of liability by a third person of the partnership obligation if the partners are to be discharged of their liabilities. Thus where a creditor of a dissolving partnership consented to an
arrangement whereby the purchaser of the

48-1-35

partnership was to pay him the money owing
to the dissolving partnership, but the purchaser had never assumed the liabilities of the
partnership, the creditor could obtain judgm e n t against the dissolving partnership when
Davis v.
t n e p u r c h a s e r failed to pay him
Kemp, 3 Utah 2d 16, 277 P.2d 816 (1951).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r .
ship §§ 906
C.J.S. —
A.L.R. —

48-1-34.

2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerto 913.
68 C.J.S. Partnership § 352.
Liability of transferor of business

operated under tradename for supplies furnished to successor by one without notice of
transfer, 70 A.L.R.3d 1250.
Key Numbers. — Partnership «= 277, 279.

Right to wind up.

Unless otherwise agreed, the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved
the partnership or the legal representatives of the last surviving partner, not
bankrupt, has the right to wind up the partnership affairs; provided, however,
that any partner, his legal representatives or his assignee upon cause shown
may obtain a winding up by the court.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, 8 37; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-34.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 1100, 1180.

48-1-35.

C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 273, 355
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 244

Rights of partners to application of partnership
property.

(1) When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the
partnership agreement, each partner, as against his copartners and all persons claiming through them in respect of their interests in the partnership,
unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount
owing to the respective partners. But if dissolution is caused by expulsion of a
partner, bona fide under the partnership agreement, and if the expelled partner is discharged from all partnership liabilities either by payment or agreement under Section 48-1-33(2), he shall receive in cash only the net amount
due him from the partnership.
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partnership agreement the rights of the partners shall be as follows:
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall have:
1st All the rights specified in paragraph (1) of this section; and,
2nd The right as against each partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully to damages for breach of the agreement.
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if
they all desire to continue the business in the same name, either by
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themselves or jointly with others, may do so during the agreed term for
the partnership, and for that purpose may possess the partnership property; provided, they pay to any partner who has caused the dissolution
wrongfully the value of his interest in the partnership at the dissolution,
less any damages recoverable under clause (2)(a) 2nd of this section or
secure the payment by bond approved by the court, and in like manner
indemnify him against all present or future partnership liabilities.
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have:
1st If the business is not continued under the provisions of paragraph (2Mb), all the rights of a partner under paragraph (1), subject to
clause (2)(a) 2nd of this section.
2nd If the business is continued under paragraph (2)(b) of this
section, the right as against his copartners, and all claiming through
them, in respect of their interests in the partnership, to have the
value of his interest in the partnership, less any damages caused to
his copartners by the dissolution, ascertained and paid to him in
cash, or the payment secured by bond approved by the court, and to
be released from all existing liabilities of the partnership; but in
ascertaining the value of the partner's interest the value of the good
will of the business shall not be considered.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 38; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-35.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
C o n t i n u a t i o n of b u s i n e s s .
Where one partner was forced to take over
the operation of a cafe to save it from further
losses due to the other partner's neglect, evidence did not support a finding that the part-

ner took over the business permanently and he
could not be charged with all the business obligations. Eardley v. Sammons, 8 Utah 2d 159,
330 P.2d 122 (1958).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 1211 to 1219.
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C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 354, 386.
Key Numbers. — Partnership «= 277, 297.

Rights where partnership is dissolved for fraud
or misrepresentation.

Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of the fraud or
misrepresentation of one of the parties thereto, the party entitled to rescind is,
without prejudice to any other right, entitled:
(1) to a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of the partnership
property, after satisfying the partnership liabilities to third persons, for
any sum of money paid by him for the purchase of an interest in the
partnership and for any capital or advances contributed by him; and,
(2) to stand, after all liabilities to third persons have been satisfied, in
the place of the creditors of the partnership for any payments made by
him in respect of the partnership liabilities; and,
(3) to be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud or making the
representation against all debts and liabilities of the partnership.
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History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 39; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-36.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 871, 903 to 905.

48-1-37,

C . J . S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 13.
Key Numbers. — Partnership «=» 25.

Rules for distribution.

In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution the following
rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary:
(1) The assets of the partnership are:
(a) The partnership property.
(b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of
all the liabilities specified in Subdivision (2) of this section
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment, as
follows:
(a) Those owing to creditors other than partners.
(b) Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits.
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of capital.
(d) Those owing to partners in respect of profits.
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of their declaration in Subsection (1) of this section to the satisfaction of the liabilities.
(4) The partners shall contribute as provided by Section 48-1-15(1) the
amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if any, but not all, of the
partners are insolvent, or, not being subject to process, refuse to contribute, the other partners shall contribute their share of the liabilities, and
in the relative proportions in which they share the profits the additional
amount necessary to pay the liabilities.
(5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors, or any person appointed by
the court, shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified in
Subsection (4) of this section.
(6) Any partner or his legal representative shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified in Subsection (4) of this section to the
extent of the amount which he has paid in excess of his share of the
liability.
(7) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for the
contributions specified in Subsection (4) of this section.
(8) When partnership property and the individual properties of the
partners are in the possession of a court for distribution, partnership
creditors shall have priority on partnership property and separate creditors on individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured creditors
as heretofore.
(9) Where a partner has become bankrupt or his estate is insolvent, the
claims against his separate property shall rank in the following order:
(a) Those owing to separate creditors.
(b) Those owing to partnership creditors.
(c) Those owing to partners by way of contribution.
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History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 40; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-37.
NOTES T(
ANALYSIS

Collection on p a r t n e r s h i p judgment.
Where partners conducted business without
books and took money from partnership for living expenses, partner could not be charged
with money collected on a partnership judgment on dissolution of partnership, in absence
of evidence that it was appropriated to his own
use for other than living expenses. Buzianis v.
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932).
Credits.
Where contribution of one partner exceeded
that of other partner and he borrowed money
from his wife for purpose of purchasing property for partnership, on dissolution he was entitled to credit for such excess and for money
borrowed, together with interest until date of
termination of partnership. Buzianis v.
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932).
Goodwill.
A partnership of certified public accountants
is of the same nalure as a partnership of attorneys or physicians and has no goodwill to be
accounted for as an asset upon dissolution in
absence of provision in partnership agreement
relating to goodwill. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18
Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966).
Where goodwill was not carried as an asset
on partnership books and partnership agreement did not contemplate that goodwill be included in book value of partnership, it was

DECISIONS

Money in bank.
In determining rights of partners upon dissolution of partnership, it was held that money
in the bank, which receiver had taken charge
of, was improperly included in the computation
of total receipts. Wardrop v. Harrison, 63 Utah
132, 222 P. 1069 (1924).
Money invested.
Where evidence supported finding that partner used partnership funds to purchase Greek
currency, he was properly charged with such
money on dissolution, together with interest to
date of termination of partnership. Buzianis v.
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932).
Partnership receipts.
Under contract dissolving partnership engaged in obtaining refunds of excessive freight
rates paid to railroads, partner leaving partnership held entitled to percentage of fee in
case that was pending at time of dissolution,
although refund obtained was on freight bills
paid after partnership was dissolved. Gallacher
v. Foubert, 85 Utah 13, 38 P.2d 297 (1934).
Repayment of contributions.
Upon dissolution and distribution of the
partnership assets, this section does not authorize the deduction of depreciation from advances made for capital improvements in repayment of the partner's contributions, and
trial court erred when it ordered such deduction for depreciation because the partnership
agreement did not authorize such deduction
and to allow the deduction would produce an
unjust result. Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66
(Utah 1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. J u r . 2d Partnership §§ 1200 to 1222.
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48-1-38. Liability of persons continuing the business in
certain cases.
proper to exclude goodwill as an item requiring
an accounting by one partner to another upon
dissolution. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d
81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966).

Collection on partnership judgment.
Credits.
Goodwill.
Money in bank.
Money invested.
Partnership receipts.
Repayment of contributions.

GENERAL PARTNERSHIP

C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 385.
Key Numbers. — Partnership «=> 300.

(1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing partnership, or
when any partner retires and assigns (or the representatives of a deceased
partner assign) his rights in partnership property to two or more of the partners, or to one or more of the partners and one or more third persons, if the
business is continued without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors
of the first, or dissolved, partnership are also creditors of the partnership so
continuing the business.
(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or the representatives of a
deceased partner assign) their rights in partnership property to the remaining
partner, who continues the business without liquidation of partnership affairs
either alone or with others, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also
creditors of the person or partnership so continuing the business.
(3) When any partner retires or dies and the business of the dissolved partnership is continued, as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section, with
the consent of the retired partner or the representatives of the deceased part
ner, but without any assignment of his right in partnership property, rights of
creditors of the dissolved partnership and of creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business shall be as if such assignment had been made.
(4) When all the partners or their representatives assign their rights in
partnership property to one or more third persons who promise to pay the
debts and who continue the business of the dissolved partnership, creditors of
the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business.
(5) When any partner wrongfully causes a dissolution and the remaining
partners continue the business under the provisions of Section 48-l-35(2)(b),
either alone or with others and without liquidation of the partnership affairs,
creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business.
(6) When a partner is expelled and the remaining partners continue the
business, either alone or with others, without liquidation of the partnership
affairs, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person
or partnership continuing the business.
(7) The liability of a third person becoming a partner in the partnership
continuing the business under this section, to the creditors of the dissolved
partnership shall be satisfied out of partnership property only.
(8) When the business of a partnership after dissolution is continued under
any conditions set forth in this section, the creditors of the dissolved partnership, as against the separate creditors of the retiring or deceased partner or
the representatives of the deceased partner, have a prior right to any claim of
the retired partner or the representatives of the deceased partner against the
person or partnership continuing the business on account of the retired or
deceased partner's interest in the dissolved partnership, or on account of any
consideration promised for such interest, or for his right in partnership property.
(9) Nothing in this section shall be held to modify any right of creditors to
set aside any assignment on the ground of fraud.
(10) The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the
partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not
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of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner liable for any
debts contracted by such person or partnership.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 41; U.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-38.

48-2-27

48-1-40. Accrual of actions.
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner or his
legal representative as against the winding-up partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of
dissolution in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah's
Business Name Statutes: "An Open Invitation
to Litigation," 1983 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 795.

Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 913 to 919. 1131 to 1133.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 255.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership e=» 237.

History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 43; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-40.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
hands of husband on death of wife, no claim or
demand whatever was made by interested parties for its recovery or for an accounting with
respect thereto, held that wife's administrator
was barred by laches from maintaining this
suit. Walton v. Broadhead, 54 Utah 320, 180 P.
433 (1919).
Delay of several years between partner's
death and action for an accounting did not require application of laches because relationship between surviving partner and deceased
partner's son, who was carrying on business,
was a confidential one, surviving partner did
not know about disputed payments, and delay
did not prejudice defendants. Bankers' Trust
Co. v. Riter, 60 Utah 1, 206 P. 276 (1922).

ANALYSIS

48-1-39. Rights of retiring or estate of deceased p a r t n e r
when the business is continued.
When any partner retires or dies and the business is continued under any of
the conditions set forth in Section 48-1-38(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), or Section
48-l-35(2)(b) without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate
and the person or partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise
agreed, he or his legal representatives as against such persons or partnership
may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and
shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his
interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option or at the
option of his legal representatives, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable
to the use of his right in the property of the dissolved partnership; provided,
that the creditors of the dissolved partnership as against the separate creditors or the representative of the retired or deceased partner shall have priority
on any claim arising under this section, as provided by Section 48-1-38(8).

Existence of partnership.
Laches.
Existence of p a r t n e r s h i p .
In action for accounting against executors of
estate of deceased, there was substantial evidence of existence of partnership between
plaintiff and deceased so that court erred in
nonsuiting plaintiff. Kimball v. McCornick, 70
Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927).
Laches.
In action by administrator of wife for partnership accounting with respect to personal
property, wherein it appeared that for period of
37 years after personal property came into

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
mences to run on right of partnership accounting, 44 A.L.R 1th 678.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership <r= 298.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 968 to 970, 1175, 1176, 1045 to 1060.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 378.
A.L.R. — When statute of limitations com-

History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 42; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-39.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Applicability.
Right of wife's distributive share.
AnDli bilitv
Application of this section was required for
settling dissolved partnership accounts between widow of partner and successors of other
partner. Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Right of wife's d i s t r i b u t i v e s h a r e .
Courts that have considered the changes
brought about by the adoption of the Uniform
Partnership Act have concluded that the legislative intention was to enact the English ruie
a nd h a v e w i t h t h e
' ,
exception of one state, held
L
that
mar ital
^ h t s , n s P e c i f i c Partnership
L
ro ert
h a v e be
P P y
e n excluded by the act. In re
°stler's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 47, 286 P.2d 796
(1955).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 907, 908, 1133.

CHAPTER 2
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
(Repealed by L a w s 1990, ch. 233, § 71.)

48-2-1 to 48-2-27.

Repealed.
nerships, effective April 23, 1990. For present
comparable provisions, see Chapter 2a of this
title. See also § 48-2a-1104 as to applicability
of former law, and § 48-2a-1106 (savings
clause).

R e p e a l s . — Laws 1990, ch. 233, § 71 repeals
§§ 48-2-1 to 48-2-12, Utah Code Annotated
1953; § 48-2-13, as amended by Laws 1975, ch.
139, § 1; and §§ 48-2-14 to 48-2-27, Utah Code
Annotated 1953; all relating to limited part-

C.J.S. - 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 251, 297.
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 232.
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JOYCE MAUGHAN - 3833
Attorney for Defendant/
Counter Claimants Peter Van
Alstyne, Gerald Robinson
and J u d i t h Erickson
455 South 300 East
Suite 355
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111
(801)359-5900
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARK 0. WALSH,

]
1
]1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

]i

Civil No. C 8 6 - 7 1 9 9

JUDITH ERICKSON a / k / a JUDE
ERICKSON; PETER VAN ALSTYNE,
and GERALD ROBINSON,

]I

Judge Moffat

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

]
]

THIS MATTER came on for t r i a l before t h e Honorable J u d g e Richard H.
Moffat on April 24 and 25, 1989.

Plaintiff was p r e s e n t and r e p r e s e n t e d by his

a t t o r n e y Steven D. Crawley and John Walsh.

Defendants J u d i t h Erickson a/k/a

Jude Erickson, Peter Van Alstyne, and Gerald Robinson were p r e s e n t and
r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i r a t t o r n e y Joyce Maughan.

The Court h a v i n g heard testimony

of t h e w i t n e s s e s and having reviewed t h e e x h i b i t s e n t e r e d on file herein, now
therefore, t h e Court e n t e r s i t s
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In December, 1984, plaintiff Mark Walsh ( h e r e i n a f t e r "Walsh") entered
1
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into an oral Partnership agreement with Van Alstyne and Robinson, creating the
Universal Video Partnership (hereinafter the "Partnership").
2.

Terms of the Partnership agreement included the following:
a. Robinson's obligations:

Robinson agreed to and did loan $30,000.00

to the Partnership for the purpose of paying a $25,000.00 payment on the Jet Star
Contract and $5,000.00 for operating expenses.

Robinson obtained the $30,000.00

by taking out a second mortgage on his home, at the bank's interest rate of
16.41% per annum.
b.

Walsh's and Van Alstyne's obligations:
(1)

Walsh and Van Alstyne agreed to repay Robinson the full

$30,000.00 plus interest at 19.41% per annum (3% plus the 16.41% rate Robinson
was paying to his bank for the mortgage he took out to loan the $30,000.00 to
start up the Universal Video Partnership.

If the Universal Video business profits

were not sufficient to repay Robinson, Walsh and Van Alstyne would personally
repay Robinson.
(2)

Walsh and Van Alstyne agreed to contribute time and labor to

manage and run the business so as to satisfy the Partnership obligations and make
a profit for the three partners.

Robinson was a "silent partner" with no

obligation to manage the business or pay its debts.
(3)

Walsh and Van Alstyne cosigned with each other to be

obligated on the following contractual obligations:
(a)

Jet Star contract dated December 8, 1984 (hereinafter

"Jet Star Contract"), pursuant to which Walsh and Van Alstyne agreed to be liable
for purchasing from Jet Star Industries the business known as Universal Video
2
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located at 5444 South 900 East, Murray, Utah.
(b)

Consent to Assignment of lease of the premises,

executed by Walsh and Van Alstyne December 21, 1984, pursuant to which Walsh
and Van Alstyne agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the tenants'
obligations under the Oakwood Village Partnership lease (hereinafter "Oakwood
Lease") dated March 11, 1982.

This obligated Van Alstyne and Walsh to an

eighteen-month lease term, from December, 1984 through June, 1985, at monthly
lease payments of $1,420.00 to $1,440.00.
(c)

Application for Credit and personal guarantee to Oscar

E. Chytraus Company (hereinafter, "Chytraus"), vendor of video tapes for the
Universal Video Business, dated January 29, 1985, pursuant to which Walsh and
Van Alstyne agreed to personally guarantee and be jointly and severally liable for
Universal Video debts to Chytraus.
(4)

When they signed as obligors on the Jet Star Contract, the

Oakwood lease, neither Walsh nor Van Alstyne asked Robinson to be responsible
for satisfaction of the obligations on those contracts or any other of the
Universal Video business debts.
c.

Rights to profits of the Universal Video Business:

Walsh, Van

Alstyne, and Robinson all agreed to share net profits equally after debts to
Robinson and third parties had been paid.

However, the debts exceeded the

profits so there were no profits to distribute.
3.

Walsh had induced Van Alstyne to enter into the Partnership business by

Walsh's representations of his previous experience and self-professed success in
the video retail business.
3
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4.

When Van Alstyne entered into the Jet Star contract, the Oakwood

Lease, and the Chytraus obligations with Walsh, Van Alstyne did so in reliance on
Walsh' financial statement in December, 1984, which financial statement showed
Walsh's net worth to be approximately $243,500.00
5.

Robinson is related to Van Alstyne by marriage.

Van Alstyne negotiated

with Robinson for the $30,000.00 loan to start up the Universal Video business.
Van Alstyne told Walsh he did not want to have Robinson loan the $30,000.00
without assurance that Robinson would be completely repaid.

Walsh assured Van

Alstyne that the Universal Video business revenue would repay Robinson, but that
even if it did not, Walsh would mortgage his home if necessary to repay
Robinson.

In reliance on those assertions by Walsh, Van Alstyne assured Robinson

that the $30,000.00 loan would be a safe investment and the debt to Robinson
would be completely repaid.
6.

In reliance on those representations and on the fact that Walsh was a

Bishop in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Robinson loaned Walsh
and Van Alstyne the $30,000.00 to start up the Universal Video business.
7.

During the first three months of operation under Walsh and Van Alstyne,

the Universal Video business generated barely enough income to pay its monthly
obligations.
8.

During those first three months of operation, Walsh was concerned that

the business revenue would not be sufficient to cover payments on the Oakwood
lease (approximately $1,500.00 per month), the debt service on the Jet Star
Contract, and the other business debts.
9.

Walsh had been concerned about t h a t debt service since before entering
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into the Jet Star Contract in December, 1984, and before getting the $30,000.00
from Robinson.
10.

Walsh did not tell Van Alstyne of this concern until January, 1985, after

Robinson had already loaned the $30,000,000, and after Walsh and Van Alstyne had
cosigned on the Jet Star Contract,

the Oakwood Lease, and the personal

guarantee to Chytraus.
11.

Van Alstyne's decision to cosign on those three contracts (Jet Star,

Oakwood, and Chytraus) with Walsh, and his decision to let Robinson loan
$30,000.00 to the business, were decisions he made in reliance on Walsh's
representations to Van Alstyne of Walsh's financial success in his previous video
store and Walsh's assertions to Van Alstyne that the Universal Vide (Jet Star
Contract) business would be a profitable venture, and that the Universal Vide
Business revenue would certainly cover the obligations on the Jet Star Contract,
the Oakwood lease, the Chytraus contract, and the repayment of $30,000.00 plus
interest to Robinson.
12.

From January 1985 on, Walsh remained concerned that the business

revenue couldn't cover the obligations to Jetstar, Oakwood, Chytraus, and
Robinson.
13.

Walsh knew that the nature of video retail business is a seasonal

business such that the most lucrative months are the winter months, and that
income drops in the summer.
14.

In March, 1985, Walsh suggested to Van Alstyne that they put the

business up for sale.
15.

Walsh had to leave town for a few days, so Van Alstyne agreed to place
5
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a newspaper ad to sell the business.
16.
newspaper.
17.

Van Alstyne placed the ad for a few days in a Salt Lake City local
The responses to the ad were discouraging.
Van Alstyne discontinued the ad because of the expense of the ad and

the poor responses to the ad.
18.

In March, 1985, Walsh told Van Alstyne that Walsh's personal financial

situation was very poor and that he was facing bankruptcy and that, therefore, he
had no assets to pay his obligations on the Universal Video obligations should the
Universal Video business revenue be insufficient to pay those debts.
19.

Van Alstyne was shocked and deeply concerned by this confession of

Walsh's purported financial troubles.
20.

In April, 1985, Walsh and Van Alstyne had an altercation because Van

Alstyne had signed Walsh's name to several business checks to pay business debts.
21.

Walsh had told Van Alstyne not to pay those certain business debts

because of the Universal Video cash flow dearth.

Van Alstyne disagreed, and

signed Walsh's name to the checks because Walsh had refused to do so.
22.

Shortly after the altercation described in the previous paragraph, Walsh

acquiesced and approved of Van Alstyne's having paid the debts with Universal
Video revenues.
23.

In the Jet Star Contract negotiations, Van Alstyne had negotiated for a

discount provision pursuant to which Van Alstyne and Walsh would receive a
discount if they could pay the contract balance to the sellers by June, 1985.
24.

With the newfound information of Walsh's personal financial distress,

Van Alstyne hoped to find a new investor to help pay the approximately
6
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$35,000.00 payoff in June, 1985 to Jet Star and to Contribute additional monies
for the business.
25.

Defendant Judith Erickson (hereinafter "Erickson") was a clerk in the

Universal Video store who had expressed interest in "buying into the store".
26.

Van Alstyne and Erickson discussed the possibility of her becoming an

additional "partner" in the business if she could contribute at least $20,000.00 to
the business.
27.

Van Alstyne told her she had to provide the $20,000.00 no later than

May 31, 1985. She failed to do so by May 31, 1985 or thereafter.
28.

Separate from Van Alstyne's negotiations with Erickson, Walsh

negotiated with Erickson to sell her his Partnership interest for $10,000.00.
29.

Erickson telephoned Van Alstyne to inform him she intended to

purchase Walsh's interest for $10,000.00
30.

Van Alstyne and others, including Erickson's legal counsel at the time,

told Erickson that $10,000.00 was far too much to pay Walsh.
31.

When Erickson told Walsh that Van Alstyne had told Erickson that

$10,000 was too high a price, Walsh reassured Erickson that $10,000.00 was a fair
price and told her that if she didn't agree to pay him the $10,000.00, Van Alstyne
would pay Walsh more than $10,000.00 to purchase Walsh's Partnership interest.
32.

Because of Walsh's experience in the video business and because Walsh

treated her such that she trusted him and believed he was looking out for her
best interest, Erickson believed Walsh over Van Alstyne and the lawyer who was
representing her at the time.
33.

On or about May 2, 1985, Erickson and Walsh signed the Sales
7
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Agreement and Promissory Note and the Assignment and Assumption Agreement/
Consent to Assignment those being the documents purporting to sell Erickson all
of Walsh's Partnership rights and obligations.
34.

The Sales documents in which Walsh purportedly sold his interest in the

business to Erickson were prepare by the attorney who was representing Walsh at
the time.
35.

Neither Walsh nor Erickson showed Van Alstyne or Robinson the Sales

Agreement, Promissory Note, Assignment and Assumption Agreement, or Consent
to Assignment.

The first time Van Alstyne or Robinson saw those documents was

in the fall of 1986 when served with Summons and Complaint in this action.
However, Walsh had indicated to Erickson that Van Alstyne had approved of the
documents (Sales Agreement, Promissory Note, Assignment and Assumption
Agreement, and Consent to Assignment) before May 2, 1985, the date she signed
the documents.
36.

Walsh received $5,500.00 from defendant Erickson toward the $10,000.00

sum, paid as follows:

$3,000.00 paid by Erickson May 2, 1985 and $500.00 for

each of the five following months (June through October, 1985).
37.

After paying the October, 1985 $500.00 installment to Walsh, Erickson

ceased paying Walsh.
38.

The reason Erickson cased paying Walsh in October, 1985 is that the

attorney who was representing her at the time told her to stop paying on the
Walsh contract because she was not getting anything for her payments.
39.

The Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement speaks for itself but includes the

following terms:
8
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a.

Walsh purportedly sold his Partnership rights and Partnership

interest to Erickson;
b.

Erickson purportedly assumed Walsh's Partnership obligations

including the following:

Jet Star obligation; Chytraus obligation; Oakwood Lease;

and utilities.
40.

On or about May 2, 1985 when Erickson and Walsh signed the Sales

Agreement, Promissory Note, Assignment and Assumption Agreement, and Consent
to Assignment, Erickson told Walsh that, contrary to the Sales Contract language,
the Jet Star sellers would not let her assume Walsh's obligations on the Jet Star
contract, and that she was concerned about assuming Walsh's obligations on the
Jet Star contract and the other debts.

In response, Walsh assured Erickson that

there would be enough business revenue from the Universal Video business to pay
the debts.
41.

Further, regarding the debt to Robinson, Walsh told Erickson not to

worry about the debt of $30,000.00 owed to him.
42.

At the time of the May 2, 1985 purported sale by Walsh to Erickson, or

any time thereafter, Walsh did not inform Erickson that Van Alstyne had made
demand on Walsh to help pay the Jet Star payoff May 31, 1985.
43.

Even though Van Alstyne and Robinson were unaware of the terms of

the written documents pursuant to which Walsh purportedly sold his Partnership
interest to Erickson, they were aware that Erickson, commencing May, 1985
believed that she was entitled to be a partner in the Partnership.
44.

After May 2, 1985 disputes and negotiations ensued between Erickson

and Van Alstyne.

The principal dispute was Erickson's claim that she was a full
9
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o n e - t h i r d p a r t n e r having t o t a l l y replaced Walsh, and Van Alstvne's claim t h a t she
was not, primarily because she had not contributed the $20,000.00 by June, 1985
to help satisfy P a r t n e r s h i p obligations.
45.

Between J u n e , 1985 and spring, 1986, various settlement negotiations

ensued between Erickson. Van Alstyne and Robinson regarding Erickson's
Partnership status.
46.

Erickson hired a lawyer to r e p r e s e n t her a g a i n s t Van Alstyne in her

claim of full o n e - t h i r d p a r t n e r s t a t u s .
47.

Though s e v e r a l proposals were made back and forth, no agreement was

ever reached between Van Alstyne, Robinson and Erickson regarding her s t a t u s as
a p a r t n e r in the Universal Video P a r t n e r s h i p .
48.

At no time did Robinson or Van Alstyne ever agree or consent to

having Erickson replace Walsh as a p a r t n e r , even though t h e r e were times when
Robinson or Van Alstyne contemplated accepting Erickson as an additional, not a
replacement, p a r t n e r , and t h e y made various offers to Erickson regarding t h i s .
49.

At no time did Robinson or Van Alstyne ever release Walsh from his

obligations to pay the Universal Video b u s i n e s s d e b t s .
50.

Van Alstyne mortgaged his family residence to obtain funds to loan t h e

P a r t n e r s h i p $30,000.00 in J u n e , 1985, to pay on t h e J e t Star contract.
51.

In the spring of 1985, Van Alstyne had told Walsh he might buy Walsh's

P a r t n e r s h i p rights and obligations for $2,000.00, but t h a t Van Alstyne would do so
only if Walsh would first pay enough to c o n t r i b u t e with Van Alstyne to satisfy
the P a r t n e r s h i p obligations.
52.

In the spring of 1985, before completing t h e 330,000.00 payoff to J e t
10
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Star, Van Alstyne made demand on Walsh to help satisfy t h e Partnership
obligations. Walsh refused, telling Van Alstyne he was facing bankruptcy and t h a t
he h a d n ' t the a s s e t s to spend on those obligations.

Van Alstyne made s u b s e q u e n t

demands on Walsh and again was refused by Walsh.
53.

The Oakwood Lease obligation, approximately $1,500.00 monthly r e n t

from J a n u a r y , 1985 through J u n e , 1986, was satisfied from t h e Universal Video
P a r t n e r s h i p business r e v e n u e .
54.

All but $6,038.18 of t h e Chytraus c o n t r a c t obligations were satisfied

from t h e Universal Video P a r t n e r s h i p business r e v e n u e .
55.

After several unsuccessful a t t e m p t s to sell t h e Universal Video

b u s i n e s s , Van Alstyne and Robinson on or about J u n e 23, 1986 sold its i n v e n t o r y
to Video USA for the sum of $25,835.00 payable with $5,835.00 down and monthly
payments of $682.00 for 36 months, the l a s t payment due May, 1989.
56.

Van Alstyne's personal financial loss from his loans to the P a r t n e r s h i p

b u s i n e s s for satisfying t h e business debts is as follows:
$30,000.00

a t 10% per annum J u n e 3, 1985 for discounted payment
on J e t Star (Defendants' Exhibit 25]

$ 5,200.00

a t 13% per annum December 18, 1985 for o n e - h a l f of
$6,038.00 final payment to C h y t r a u s and o n e - h a l f of
$4,362.00 final payment on J e t S t a r c o n t r a c t

$13,493.65

Total i n t e r e s t a t t h e above specified 10% and 13% r a t e s

$48,693.65

TOTAL VAN ALSTYNE PERSONAL FINANCIAL LOSS FROM
HIS LOANS TO THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS FOR
SATISFYING THE BUSINESS DEBTS

57.

In addition to t h e initial $30,000.00 loan a t 19.41% per annum, Robinson

loaned the business $5,200.00 a t 13% per annum December 18, 1985 for o n e - h a l f of
11
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t h e $6,038.00 final payment to Chytraus and o n e - h a l f of the $4,632.00 final
payment on t h e J e t Star Contract.
58.

Robinson's loss from t h e loans set forth in the previous paragraph,

after

applying all of the Video USA sale proceeds to offset Robinson's loss, is
$10,718.45 through May 2 1 , 1989.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and e n t e r s i t s
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Terms of t h e P a r t n e r s h i p Agreement between Walsh, Van Alstyne,

and Robinson were as s e t forth in p a r a g r a p h 2 of t h e Facts above.

In summary,

in e x c h a n g e for Robinson's loan of the $30,000.00 s t a r t - u p funds for the b u s i n e s s ,
Walsh and Van Alstyne agreed:

(a) to repay Robinson;

(b) to be responsible for

t h e p a r t n e r s h i p business debts; and (c) to s h a r e in equal thirds with Robinson t h e
b u s i n e s s profits, even though it finally t u r n e d out t h a t t h e r e were no b u s i n e s s
profits.
a.

Debts to Robinson:

Walsh as a manager of the P a r t n e r s h i p ' s

Universal Video business with responsibility to manage t h e business so as to pay
i t s d e b t s , is responsible to repay Robinson for o n e - h a l f of Robinson's loans to t h e
P a r t n e r s h i p as s e t forth in t h e fActs above.

The debt to Robinson, after

credition to Robinson all of t h e proceeds of t h e June, 1986 sale of the Universals
Video i n v e n t o r y to Video USA, t o t a l s $10,718.45 with i n t e r e s t through May 2 1 ,
1989 for o n e - h a l f t h a t sum (paragraph 57, F a c t s above).

Robinson should be

g r a n t e d judgment a g a i n s t Walsh effective May 2 1 , 1989 against walsh for o n e - h a l f
of t h a t sum, $5,359.23
b.

Other p a r t n e r s h i p Business debts for which Walsh owes Van A l s t y n e :
12

Pursuant to the terms of the Partnership agreement (paragraph 2, Facts above),
Walsh and Van Alstyne, and not Robinson, were equally responsible for the
business debts to Chytraus, Jet Star, Oakwood, and other business creditors.
Pursuant to his right of contribution per Section 48-1-15(1), Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, Van Alstyne should be granted judgment against Walsh effective
May 21, 1989 against Walsh for $24,346.82, which represents one-half of Van
Alstyne's $48,693.65 loss form paying those creditors from his personal funds
(paragraph 59, Facts above).
2.

Walsh is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne and Robinson:

"Partners . . . occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal with each other in
the utmost good faith."

Burke \r. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982) citing

section 4 8 - 1 - 1 8 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

The Court finds by

clear and convincing evidence that Walsh breached his fiduciary duty to Van
Alstyne and Robinson in several regards, including the following:
a.

Before borrowing the $30,000.00 form Robinson to purchase the

Universal Video business under the Jet Star Contract, Walsh was wary of the debt
service on the contract and was concerned that the business revenue would not
cover the debt serve, let alone the loan payments to Robinson and the other
business debts, and yet he borrowed the $30,000.00 from Robinson and had Van
Alstyne cosign with Walsh on the underlying contracts and personal guarantee to
Chytraus without warning Van Alstyne and Robinson of the risk involved.
b.

Walsh abandoned the Partnership May 2, 1985, leaving Van Alstyne

to manage and pay the debts of a business in which he had virtually no
experience, and leaving the debt to Robinson unpaid.
13
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c.

Walsh attempted to sell his partnership interest to Erickson without

fully disclosing to Van Alstyne and Robinson the terms of the sale and without
informing them that he received $5,500.00 from Erickson.
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the said breaches of
fiduciary duty were done by Walsh in a manner that showed a knowing and
reckless indifference to and disregard of the rights of Van Alstyne and Robinson,
and that Walsh either knew or should have known that he said conduct would, in
a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to Van Alstyne and
Robinson.
For Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne, Van Alstyne should be
granted judgment against Walsh for $24,346.82 actual damages.
For Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to Robinson, Robinson should be
granted judgment against Walsh for $5,359.23 actual damages.
3.

Validity of Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement:

The Sales Agreement

entered into by Walsh and Erickson May 2, 1985 [Defendants' Exhibit 12] is void
for lack of consideration and void for failure of consideration.

Section I of the

Agreement purported to convey to Erickson all of Walsh's one-third partnership
rights and interest in the Universal Video business.

Walsh did not have the

authority or right to convey his Partnership rights.

Walsh's sale to Erickson was

tantamount to the proverbial "sale of the Brooklyn Ridge".

Walsh's promise to

convey all of his partnership rights to Erickson was illusory because it required
approval (never obtained) by Van Alstyne and Robinson.
When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a
statement . . . such . . . that the person making it commits
himself to nothing, the alleged "promise" is said to be
"illusory". An illusory promise, neither binds the person
14
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making it, 1 Corbin on Contracts Section 145 (1963), nor
functions as consideration for a return promise. IcL at 628.
Resource Management Company v^ Weston Ranch and Livestock Company Inc., 706
P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985).

Thus the Sales Agreement is void for lack of

consideration because Walsh's promise to convey his Partnership rights to
Erickson was illusory because it committed Walsh to nothing because he had no
legal right to make that commitment without consent from Van Alstyne and
Robinson.
Even if the Sales Agreement were not void for lack of consideration, it is
void for failure of consideration.
contract.

When consideration is lacking, there is no

When consideration fails, there was a contract when the agreement was

made, but the promised performance has failed. DeMentas v^ Estate of Tallas, 95
Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah App. 1988).

Walsh failed to deliver the consideration

(his Partnership rights) to Erickson because he was never authorized to do so by
the other partners, Van Alstyne and Robinson.
a.

All partners' consents are required for sale of partner's rights:

Pursuant to Sections 4 8 - 1 - 2 1 and 48-1-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
both Van Alstyne's and Robinson's consent would be required to imbue Erickson
with Walsh's Partnership rights (as apposed to his mere Partnership interest,
which is the partner's right to profits) to manage or administer Partnership
business or affairs.
b.

Neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson consented, either explicitly or

implicitly, to the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement.

Van Alstyne and Robinson did

not even see the document until this lawsuit was filed.

After Erickson signed the

documents and began paying Walsh the $500.00 monthly installments, several
15
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months of arguments ensued between Erickson and Van Alstyne because Van
Alstyne and Robinson did not ever accept Erickson as a full o n e - t h i r d p a r t n e r to
replace Walsh.
c.

Neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson released Walsh from his

P a r t n e r s h i p obligations.

The fact t h a t Van Alstyne and Robinson made significant

P a r t n e r s h i p business decisions after May 1, 1985 without consulting Walsh does
not imply a release of Walsh or a consent to his sale to Erickson.
abandoned t h e p a r t n e r s h i p May 2, 1985.

Walsh

Section 4 8 - 1 - 6 , Utah Code Annotated

1953, as amended, provides t h a t a p a r t n e r who abandons the Partnership b u s i n e s s
does not h a v e to be included in other p a r t n e r s ' decisions to sell or assign
P a r t n e r s h i p property.

There was no novation to s u b s t i t u t e Erickson for Walsh to

pay Walsh's P a r t n e r s h i p obligations.

"For a novation to occur, t h e r e must be (1)

an e x i s t i n g and valid c o n t r a c t , (2) an agreement to t h e new contract by all
p a r t i e s , (3) a new valid c o n t r a c t , and (4) an extinguishment of the old c o n t r a c t
by t h e new one."

Hormana v^ Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1 3 5 2 - 1 3 5 3 (Utah App. 1987).

See also F i r s t American Commerce Company v^ Washington Mutual Savings Bank,
743 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1987); and

D.A. Taylor Company v^ Paulson, 552 P.2d 1274

(Utah 1976).
d.

Neither mistake of fact nor mistake of law by Erickson or

Walsh would v a l i d a t e t h e Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement.

Even if Walsh and

Erickson both mistakenly believed when t h e y e n t e r e d into the Sales Agreement
t h a t Van Alstyne and Robinson had consented to t h e Agreement, t h a t mistake
would not be grounds for v a l i d a t i n g t h e Sales Agreement,

Langston v^ McQuarrie,

741 P.2d 544 (Utah App. 1987); Mooney v^ GR and Associates, 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah
16
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App. 1987).

To allow such a mistake of fact to validate the Sales Agreement

would be analogous to validating a contract for sale of the Brooklyn Bridge by a
seller who believed he had legal rights to sell the bridge but who in fact did not.
Rather than being validated because it was obtained by mistake, the Sales
Agreement is voidable because obtained by mistake.

"An agreement obtained by

misrepresentation, fraud, or mistake is generally voidable."

Tanner v^ District

Judges of the Third Judicial District Court, 649 P.2d 5,6 (Utah 1982) citing 17 Am.
Jr. 2nd Contracts Section 143, et seq.
Next, regarding mistake of law, ignorance of the law is no excuse.

Walsh's

or Erickson's mistake in legal interpretation of the Sales Agreement (mistakenly
believing the Agreement was legally valid because of mistaken belief that
partner's consent is not legal requirement for other partner's sale of his
Partnership rights) would not be grounds sufficient for validating the Agreement.
Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9 (Utah 1982).
e.

The Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement is not severable so as to

make Erickson liable to Walsh for the $10,000.00 contract price and award her
only Walsh's Partnership interest (right to accounts receivable) instead of all of
his Partnership rights (e.g., management rights not assignable without other
partners' consent).

There is no severability clause in the Sales Agreement.

Section I of the Sales Agreement purports to sell all of Walsh's Partnership rights
and interest in one total package.

The Sales Agreement does not break down the

$10,000.00 sales price into units separately specifying a certain sum for Walsh'
Partnership rights and another sum for Walsh's Partnership interest.

Further,

there was no indication by Walsh or Erickson at trial of any intent by either of
17
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them t h a t the contract be s e v e r a b l e .

"A c o n t r a c t is s e v e r a b l e or e n t i r e depending

on t h e i n t e n t of the p a r t i e s at the time t h e y e n t e r e d into the contract."
Management Services Corp. v^ Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah
1980).
4.

Walsh was unjustly enriched a t Erickson's expense by his receiving and

keeping the $5,500.00 which Erickson paid him from May 2, 1985 through October,
1985 as installments on t h e Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement.
Agreement is void.

The Sales

Erickson received nothing of v a l u e from Walsh for t h e

$5,500.00 she paid him.

Erickson is e n t i t l e d to judgment a g a i n s t Walsh for t h e

$5,500.00 plus pre-judgment i n t e r e s t a t 10% per annum from and after October 3 1 ,
1985.
Even if the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement were valid, Utah p a r t n e r s h i p
law would require Walsh to hold as t r u s t e e for t h e P a r t n e r s h i p t h e $5,500.00 and
any other funds he received from Erickson u n d e r t h e Sales Agreement.
Every p a r t n e r must account to t h e p a r t n e r s h i p for any
benefit, and hold as t r u s t e e for it any profits, derived by
him without the consent of t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r s from any
t r a n s a c t i o n connected with t h e formation, conduct or
liquidation of the p a r t n e r s h i p or from any use by him of i t s
property.
Section 4 8 - 1 - 1 8 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

The $5,500.00 was

derived by Walsh from Erickson without t h e consent of Van Alstyne or Robinson
and was connected with the conduct of t h e P a r t n e r s h i p .

Even if t h e Walsh-

Erickson Sales Agreement were Valid, Utah Law would require Walsh to disgorge
t h e $5,500.00 to help Van Alstyne pay t h e P a r t n e r s h i p d e b t s .
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
Erickson should be granted judgment a g a i n s t Walsh as follows:
18
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Actual damages of $5,500.00 (five thousand five hundred and no/100 dollars)
plus 10% pre-judgment interest from October 31, 1985 for restitution of Walsh's
unjust enrichment.
Robinson should be granted judgment against Walsh as follows:
Total actual damages of $5,359.23 (five thousand three hundred and fifty-nine
and 23/100 dollars) plus 10% pre-judgment interest from and after May 21, 1987
for Walsh's one-half share of the unpaid portion of the $30,000.00 loan and for
repayment to Robinson of Walsh's one-half share of the unpaid portion of
Robinson's $5,200.00 loan to the Partnership business December 18," 1985 to pay
Chytraus and Jet Star.
Van Alstyne should be granted judgment against Walsh as follows:
Actual damages of $24,326.82 (twenty four thousand three hundred twenty six
and 82/100 dollars) plus 10% pre-judgment interest from and after May 21, 1989
pursuant to Van Alstyne's right of contribution, representing one-half of the
partnership debts paid personally by Van Alstyne.

DATED this
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, the undersigned, certify t h a t on t h e
1
day of October, 1990, I
mailed a t r u e and correct copy of t h e foregoing document by f i r s t - c l a s s mail to
t h e following:
Steven D. Crawley, Esq.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South
Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84101
John Walsh, Esq.
3865 South Wasatch Blvd.
Cove Point Plaza
Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84109
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